ERDOGANS GLORIOUS ARMY OF BANDITS & THUGS !
Τετάρτη 16 Οκτωβρίου 2019
Τρίτη 8 Οκτωβρίου 2019
Οι Κούρδοι το ξέχασαν αυτό και θα την πληρώσουν αυτή την αμνησία.
Οι Κούρδοι το ξέχασαν αυτό και θα την πληρώσουν αυτήν τους την αμνησία.
Λυπάμαι, αλλά όσο "φιλοκούρδος" και να είμαι, διότι είμαι, δεν μπορώ να τούς συγχωρέσω αυτήν τους την αμνησία.
Έφεραν τους εαυτούς τους, από ανάγκη, σε αυτή την θέση, και δεν είναι σωστό να τους λέμε ψέματα.
Άλλο πράγμα η κυνική συμμαχία, και άλλο πράγμα η αυτοεξαπάτηση και η αφέλεια ως και υποτέλεια σε συμμάχους [=USA] που ήξεραν ότι δεν έχουν καμία φερεγγυότητα ή εντιμότητα στις συναλλαγές και τις συμμαχίες τους.
Ιωάννης Τζανάκος
Ιωάννης Τζανάκος
Πέμπτη 3 Οκτωβρίου 2019
Τρίτη 1 Οκτωβρίου 2019
“A real revolution is a mass of contradictions”
In October 2016 Peter Loo travelled to Rojava*
to volunteer as an English teacher and participate in work within civil
society – the outcome of over 14 months of organising within the Plan C
Rojava solidarity cluster. He is currently working for the SYPG campaign in Qamishlo.
As well as directly offering his skills Peter has been able to visit
places in Rojava and speak to many people as the future of Rojava, and
Syria in general, continues to hang in the air. This interview took
place late in December 2016. First published on Novara.
Hi Peter, we’ve got lots of questions about your experiences so
far but perhaps you could explain a little about the history to date for
some readers who might not know too many of the details.
Well, we should start by briefly talking about the origins of the
revolution. Many people skip over this part but it is vital to
understanding the dynamics of the whole revolution. The Democratic Union
party (PYD) who led the revolution have been active in northern
Syria/western Kurdistan (Rojava is the Kurmanji word for west) since
2003. Before them the Workers’ party of Kurdistan (PKK), who the PYD are
affiliated to, were permitted by the regime to use the region as a base
to organise against the Turkish state until they were ejected in 1998.
The first protests against [Syrian
president Bashar al-] Assad started in early 2011 and by the spring the
PYD had begun to focus effort into organising the Kurdish community,
forming local committees and armed self-defence units (the precursors to
the YPG and female YPJ forces).
This was to be the social basis for the revolution. In the middle of
July in 2012, as the social movement against Assad turned into a bloody
military conflict involving many international powers, these
self-defence forces, bolstered by PKK-trained guerrillas, evicted the
regime from several towns and cities in the north. The PYD’s defence
forces took control of major roads and evicted the regime forces from
key infrastructure sites with very few clashes or casualties.
The uprising had a distinct geography: areas with a predominant
Kurdish population where the PYD had been organising were the ones to
rise up and eject the regime forces. In areas without an overwhelming
Kurdish majority, Assad’s forces managed to maintain a presence. Here in
Qamishlo, where an estimated 20% of the population support the regime,
there was some heavy fighting but the regime managed to hold onto many
of the public buildings. July 2012 marks the emergence of Rojava as a
distinct force in the Syrian conflict. The cantons which were formed
declared themselves to be against Assad (though arguing that he should
be removed through elections not force), yet not a part of the rapidly
fragmenting constellation of Syrian rebels. The relationship between
Rojava and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – the military forces initially
formed by the rebels – is a complicated one and there have been examples
of both co-operation and conflict between Rojava and different parts of
the FSA since the beginning of the revolution.
This account of the origins of the
revolution as an insurrection is contested by those more critical of the
Rojava revolution and its refusal to join the wider uprising against
Assad. Most publicly in the UK these critics include Robin Yassin-Kassab
and Leila al-Shami, the authors of Burning Country.
In this book, which only briefly touches on Rojava, the authors argue
the withdrawal of Assad’s forces was “apparently co-ordinated” with the
PYD, whose coming to power was a fait accompli, agreed beforehand with
the regime in order to free troops up from guard duty to fight the
rebels elsewhere. These two narratives (fait accompli or successful
insurrection) clash and I don’t have a definite answer – perhaps things
will become clearer in the next few months as the future of Rojava’s
relationship with the regime becomes apparent. However the fait accompli
argument doesn’t explain why there were military casualties in the
initial days, nor why hostilities continue sporadically. A conspiracy
doesn’t seem that likely. Rather, [it’s likely that] recognising the
political reality in Rojava had changed with the insurrection, Assad
renegotiated his political position with regards to this part of Syria,
possibly keeping his options open in the long term.
From this beginning the revolution
has expanded geographically – two of its three cantons are directly
connected (Kobane and Cizire cantons), and fighting continues to connect
these to Efrin canton – and also socially. A political system based
around decentralisation (the confederal system) and the construction of
local-level ‘communes’ has been instituted, an economic system which
prioritises co-operatives and provides for the people’s basic needs is
in place, and a massive shift in gender relations is under way. This is
one of the most exciting political struggles
being undertaken in the world today both in terms of its scale and
scope, made all the more impressive given the conflict continuing to
unfold in Syria and the hostility it faces from neighbouring countries.
We’ll come back to the revolution’s relationship with the regime
later on. So the revolution began as a PYD-led movement, primarily
supported by Kurds?
Exactly. After what we could call the insurrectionary phase of the
revolution – removing the regime from effective control – the next phase
was one of political consolidation and the implementation of a
political programme. This programme has three central planks: a system
of grassroots democracy (which exists in a relationship with formal
political parties and some form of representative system) which goes
under the name of democratic confederalism, a women’s revolution, and an
ecological programme (by far the least developed aspect at the moment).
Building support for this programme beyond both the PYD and the Kurdish
community were the immediate tasks of the revolution.
Many smaller political parties are now an active part of the revolution, working together beneath the umbrella of TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society).
But obviously not everyone is supportive of what is happening. ENKS, a
coalition of 16 parties dominated by Massoud Barzani, president of the
Kurdish regional government (KRG) of Iraq, has been a vocal opponent of
many of the developments here in Rojava. Barzani does not share the
political vision of the PYD, modelling KRG on oil states like Dubai, and
is currently implementing a full embargo on Rojava alongside his ally
Turkey which is causing all kinds of problems. Because of these tensions
Carl Drott from the University of Oxford has argued that “sometimes it
seems that the only consistent policy of the KCN [ENKS] is to oppose
anything that the PYD does.”
More importantly the revolution has
prioritised gaining the trust and support of all the communities here in
Rojava. These communities (Arab, Syriac, Chechen, Armenian, Turkmen,
etc.) are participating in increasing numbers as time goes on and they
see the ideas of the revolution – and its benefits – put into practice
as well as seeing that the regime isn’t coming back. The reasons for
supporting the revolution vary from the more politically motivated, such
as a desire for a free Kurdistan or a belief in the politics of [the
PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah] Öcalan
and his vision of confederalism, to the less abstract desire for peace,
security and the provision of basic services which the revolution is
providing. The YPG and YPJ are pretty much universally loved here and
this support has extended to the military alliance – the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) – they have built with other progressive
militias (of different ethnicities) in the region.
The revolution began from within the
Kurdish community and work to build support for it within other
communities is a central priority. This includes working with the
thousands of Arab refugees fleeing the conflict in the rest of Syria who
are being blocked from travelling to Europe by the Turkish state. Part
of my work with TEV-DEM
here centres around building this support across communities. The
Syriac community, for example, is starkly divided between the regime and
revolution, with each faction possessing its own military and police
units. Passing through the Syriac neighbourhoods these division are
quite clear, one street full of portraits of Assad and the regime’s
flag, the next containing pro-revolution checkpoints with revolutionary
slogans on the walls.
Let’s tackle the thorny question of the relationship between the regime and the PYD. In short, what’s going on?
Well, as I said earlier, the revolution didn’t kick the regime out
everywhere. Here in Qamishlo, the regime still has a presence. When
Aleppo was ‘liberated’ recently for example, there were loud, noisy
celebrations for Assad’s victory in some neighbourhoods and the regime
still pays the salaries of some civil servants like teachers.
Occasionally clashes break out in the cities where the regime still has a
presence such as Qamishlo and Hasseke.
As I said earlier the revolution here has constituted itself as a
force independent of the wider rebel movement against Assad (itself very
diverse). It has relied on the support of international social
movements, progressive political parties, and also most controversially
on the support of large states such as the USA and (at times) Russia.
These have to some extent prevented Assad or, more likely at the moment,
the Turkish state from outright crushing them, but the situation is
still perilous. With regards to the regime, it’s unclear at the moment
how the regime will orientate itself towards Rojava and vice-versa. At
the moment, neither side has the outright military strength to easily
defeat the other. With the defeat of the rebels basically being assured
with the re-occupation of Aleppo this might all change. For example, the
YPG and YPJ in the large Kurdish neighbourhood of Aleppo, Sheiq
Maqsoud, who defended it from rebel attacks (and also aided Assad’s
forces at some points in the fighting) have now pulled out, only leaving
Asayish (armed police) in the neighbourhood.
This ‘relationship’ with the regime has been criticised by many. At
the start of the Syrian uprising the potential for a broader alliance
between Kurds and Arabs seemed possible but failed for a variety of
reasons. These include a latent Arab chauvinism, a by-product of decades
of colonial rule in Rojava by the regime which was one factor in the
unwillingness of both the regime and the rebels to see Kurdish autonomy
established. The rise to pre-eminence of Islamist forces on the rebel
side also blocked a wide-scale alliance between the Rojava revolution
and the rebels. Alliances have been made with forces in the regions that
make up the cantons, the SDF for example, but a broad alliance with the
larger factions on the rebel side did not come about. This missed
alliance, if it was ever possible, has probably significantly shaped the
outcome of the rest of the conflict.
We have seen a rapid expansion of the Rojava cantons, particularly
into areas with a sizeable Arab population. Could you tell us about
your experiences of how the different ethnic groups are accommodated
into the revolution, and how it has been received?
Since 2015 the areas controlled by
the cantons have expanded massively through their offensives against
Isis. It’s undeniable that one reason for this is to build a continuous,
connected system of cantons. These offensives, by a primarily Kurdish
military into primarily Arab areas, have thrown up some problems. I had
the opportunity to visit the front at Salouk in December. As the Raqqa
offensive pushed the front lines further forward people were being
allowed to return to their villages. In the main the villagers I met
seemed broadly supportive of the SDF forces they came into contact with.
However, not all the villagers support what is happening – many, we
were told, had been or still were supporters of Isis. We visited one
Tabur (military unit) which had been the victim of a suicide attack
earlier in the year; the attacker was a frequent visitor from the
village next door.
As the area controlled by the confederal system has expanded, changes
have taken place to accommodate the increasing numbers of non-Kurdish
participants. I’ve mentioned the SDF as a multi-ethnic military
coalition, which marked a positive step forward for the revolution. The
current official name of the region, the Democratic Federal System of
Northern Syria, is an indication of the multi-ethnic project the
revolution is trying to build. We saw one of the co-chairs of the
confederal system, Mansur Salem, who is a Syrian arab, speak a while
back and he was stressing how building this multi-ethnic support is a
key political challenge for the revolution.
To what extent is the ideology of the revolution in Rojava being taken up by ordinary people?
Visitors arriving in Rojava expecting
some kind of transcendental revolutionary experience will be
disappointed. Given the amazing work that is happening, and all the
great media being produced for western audiences this isn’t surprising,
but beyond the front the way the revolution is manifesting itself can
often be quite subtle or even not as developed as one might expect or
hope.
I’ve already mentioned the fact that
spreading the values of the revolution into other communities is a work
in progress. As another example, whilst the higher levels of the
confederal system, especially in cities, are well developed, the lowest
level, the commune –
a neighbourhood level institution in which the most direct
participation in political assemblies and politically-themed committees
takes place – is not as widespread as one might think from the outside.
The reasons for this come back to the origins and dynamics of the
insurrectionary phase of the revolution as discussed earlier.
Counterintuitively, we have the higher levels of this political system
actively trying to expand the grassroots level of political
participation. Lots of work is taking place to expand the numbers of
communes numerically and geographically. It requires finding physical
resources and educating people in the local community about the values
of the revolution and the way the (sometimes complicated) systems work
here. But perhaps the most visible element of the revolution is the role
of women in society here.
That was going to be my next question. The image often projected
of the revolution emphasises women’s liberation and the role of the YPJ
in leading the call to change gender relations. How much does this
impact on daily life in Rojava, and is it really such a fundamental part
of the movement?
A criticism from the left in Europe, as exemplified in a recent article by Gilles Dauvé,
is that the women’s revolution in Rojava is limited to the women in the
YPJ. If it were then Rojava could not be seen to be having a women’s
revolution. After all, the Israeli state conscripts female soldiers and
[Muammar] Gaddafi was famous for having female bodyguards. History is
littered with examples of women playing a significant role in social
struggles or military conflicts, only to be returned to subservient
social positions at the ending of hostilities. But this isn’t where the
women’s revolution stops here in Rojava. Neither does it stop at the
point of ensuring 40% women’s representation in all committees and an
equality of speaking roles (alone a step beyond most western states).
Underpinning all these clearly
visible outcomes is the slow, patient development of the women’s
political movement: political education for women to develop their
skills and build the confidence of future organisers, forms of
(re)education and intervention against abusive men, the activity of
women’s committees at all levels of the confederal system, and the
tireless work of the Kongreya Star (star congress) – the organised expression of the women’s movement here.
Once again, this isn’t a problem-free process; these changes are
being built upon a hugely conservative society where violence against
women, honour killings, forced marriage, an incredibly huge pay
differential, as well as the more humdrum features of patriarchy were
all extremely common before the revolution. The movement is working hard
to bring everyone with them, to be firm and take immediate action where
needed or to take a more long-term approach where this is more
effective.
Like everything here, it shares many
features with western movements but retains many differences. The
political underpinnings of the women’s movement here are collectively
called Jineology,
which means the science of women. Öcalan is, unsurprisingly, a key
jineological theorist and has laid out a broad argument about the
historical roots of patriarchy which overcame a peaceful matriarchal
society. Capitalism is seen as inherently patriarchal and Öcalan, who is
once again the key reference point for the movement, argues “the need
to reverse the role of man is of revolutionary importance.”
But some parts of this theory will be
more problematic for some feminists in the west. For example, the
Jineological approach to gender seems to be an essentialist one where
definite characteristics are assigned to the genders. Queer feminists
will find this ideology quite challenging. The politics of sexuality are
also quite different than in the west, for cadre sexual relations are
pretty much forbidden and in the rest of society there is a strong
emphasis on abstinence until marriage. In many interviews when queer
sexuality is raised the standard answer seems to be something along the
lines of ‘we’ve never met a gay person in Rojava before’. However this
is something which will hopefully be addressed as time goes on, and I’ve
heard reports of public lectures on LGBT politics taking place in some
areas.
That’s a good point about Jineology not mapping onto western
feminism directly. Could this be said about Apoist movements in general?
Yeah, definitely. Lots of debates
about the PKK built on answering the question ‘are they an anarchist
organisation?’ have gone around in circles because they have failed to
actually analyse the movement itself. In the same way the PKK was never a
straightforward Marxist-Leninist organisation historically, it isn’t an
anarchist movement today. The PKK and its sister organisations
self-define as ‘Apoist’ – a movement built around Abdullah Öcalan and
his, well, quite eclectic work. The movements based on his political
vision are contradictory, especially since the development of the ‘new
paradigm’ since Öcalan’s arrest in 1999. This paradigm significantly
changed many parts of the PKK’s political vision. Although the PKK has
now formally renounced the desire for an independent Kurdish state and
replaced it with its model of democratic confederalism, it is still a
hierarchical movement with strict discipline for cadre and a cult of
personality around Öcalan himself. Its conception of revolution doesn’t map onto those conceptions held by classical revolutionary movements, being:
“…neither the anarchist idea of abolishing the whole state
immediately, nor the communist idea of taking over the whole state
immediately. Over time we will organise alternatives to each part of the
state run by the people, and when they succeed, that part of the state
dissolves.”
Quite importantly its critique of
capitalism, or capitalist modernity in its own terminology, whilst quite
opaque (an opacity which isn’t helped by the lack of movement works
translated into English) certainly isn’t as fundamental as those coming
from the Marxist tradition. Whilst the Apoist movement corresponds with
many of the values of socialist and anarchist traditions it is something
distinct and different.
There was an article by two other international volunteers
who self-define as anarchists on the Plan C website a short while ago.
The article makes some useful and important points about the complicated
practicalities of showing solidarity here and for that it should
definitely be read. They make the (uncontroversial) point that working
in Rojava is not neutral. The choices of who and how we work with here
will strengthen some groups, individuals and dynamics rather than
others, and we need to be aware of this.
I read this as making the implicit
argument common to many on the anti-authoritarian left to support the
people or the social movements rather than organised parties. A
particular problem with that perspective here is that the Apoist
movement has transcended the boundaries of its political parties and is
also a mass social movement with elements of self-organisation beyond
the parties. I’d argue that the revolutionary left needs to be
supporting the PYD and Apoist movements across the Middle East rather
than some loosely defined, potentially fictitious unaligned ‘people’.
They are a very large, possibly the largest, progressive force in the
Middle East and a large part of their politics resonate strongly with
our own. Demonstrating a serious commitment to real solidarity work,
which once it moves beyond writing articles starts to become very
challenging, helps to build the platform from which to engage in
discussion with these movements. There are parts of the Apoist vision
which I’d love to critically debate with them (for instance definitions
and critiques of capitalism) but this will probably only happen
meaningfully when one can demonstrate a track record of sorts.
Going back to the communes, how important are they?
At the local level they are important for solving small problems,
highlighting big ones, and function as the most local transmission belt
of the ideas of the revolution. As well as running the local meetings
and committees, the lower levels of the system serve as centres to
mobilise people for self-defence or for demonstrations and rallies. When
we go to political events we usually leave in large convoys of buses
from our neighbourhood’s Mala Gel (People’s House – basically a social
centre) and when we organise events the local communes are a vital
resource for directly connecting with people. I haven’t seen enough of
this quite complex system to judge to what extent the ideas from the
base of this system are listened to higher up the federal system through
the various elected delegates and thematic committees.
It’s quite funny, I met a European Marxist-Leninist here who was
convinced the anarchists had got the entire revolution wrong and that
the communes had a very peripheral role in what was going on. For him,
the revolution was dominated by the PYD with the YPG and YPJ providing
the muscle behind it. When he met one of the international Marxist-Leninist parties
here doing consistent community work promoting and actually setting up
communes his whole attitude completely changed. Perhaps some on the left
are a bit optimistic about how developed the commune system is but it
definitely exists and is growing, we just shouldn’t confuse our desires
with reality.
The Economy Question: One of the most important questions for many on the left is what kind of economy is being built?
Northern Syria was historically deliberately underdeveloped by the
Syrian regime and treated like an internal colony. Arab settlers were
encouraged to move into the region and alongside the exploitation of oil
reserves found in the area, the other main sector, agricultural
production, was strictly managed. What is now Efrin canton had its many
forests replaced with olive plantations whilst in the 1970s the regime
spread the rumour that a particularly vicious tomato blight was
spreading from Turkey in order to encourage the conversion of
agricultural production in Cizire canton completely to wheat. In winter,
driving through the endless empty fields which make up the countryside
in Cizire canton is quite a bleak experience. Efforts are now underway
to diversify agricultural production for both ecological and economic
reasons.
So the revolution did not inherit
much in the way of large scale means of production. The few large
productive sites that exist have been socialised. I think these are a
concrete factory, the oil wells, and, since the Manbij campaign, the
Tishrin dam. Here in Qamishlo there are about 60 ‘factories’ with a
maximum size of 20 employees. Some of these are private initiatives,
some run as co-operatives. The commercial and logistical side of life in
Rojava is also on the small scale. When the regime was evicted there
was little in the way of large scale logistics systems – transport
systems, or the integrated logistics systems large supermarket chains
possess – which could be socialised. The tiny rail system is out of
commission and the regime holds the airport in Qamishlo, which only
hosts an infrequent internal route to Damascus.
In a great interview by Janet Biehl, the adviser for economic development in Cizire canton discusses the ‘three economies’
functioning in parallel in Rojava. You can read about it yourself but
in short these are the ‘war economy’, the ‘open economy’ (i.e. the
private economy) and the ‘social economy’. At the moment the war economy
– subsidised bread and oil for example – dominates with the social
economy of co-operatives being pointed out as a future hope. Obviously
the danger is if/when the embargo is lifted and private investment is
allowed in – especially for expensive infrastructure like oil refineries
and heavy industry – that the social economy is completely outcompeted.
I wouldn’t want to venture a
prediction about the future of the economy here, though the future
challenges seem quite clear, but I can say it’s disappointing that some
on the left aren’t supporting what is happening here because of the
persistence of private property, commodity production and the wage
relation. This is a kind of ‘all or nothing’ purism which often comes
from such an abstract place, seemingly removed from an acknowledgement
of the difficulties of actual social change. No revolution so far has
managed to abolish capitalist relations – let alone in the space of a
few years, during an international proxy war, whilst also under embargo!
Whilst the Apoist critique of capitalist modernity is certainly not a
Marxist one, here in Rojava its economic strategy is broadly a
progressive one – albeit with question marks over the future – which
deserves our solidarity.
To withhold support because
capitalism will still function in some form for the foreseeable future
seems short-sighted. It’s interesting that we often support
non-communist social struggles right up to the point that they attain
the ability to significantly change the world, at which point many of us
withdraw our support. We need to take a longer term view of social
change which recognises it as a contradictory and complicated process.
Just because the revolution here isn’t immediately implementing
communism doesn’t mean we shouldn’t support it.
What is the dominant political make-up of international
volunteers? What kind of expectations do they come with, and in what
ways are those confirmed or subverted?
In general, the people who arrive
here are a mixture of the starry eyed and those expecting something a
bit more realistic. At one point, based on internet coverage alone, it
seemed as if the majority of volunteers were adventurers, well-meaning
liberals, or even more right-wing people just here to fight Isis. But
whilst this might have been the case at one point it certainly isn’t
now. The YPG has noticed the problematic views and behaviours of some of
its volunteers and has started to be more selective when it comes to who is volunteering.
Unsurprisingly, there are many
volunteers from the Kurdish diaspora but beyond this the majority of
volunteers I’ve met or heard about here are leftists. There is a
relatively large presence of Turkish comrades from Marxist-Leninist and
Maoist organisations for example. The other volunteers here are mainly
from Europe and north America, and the majority are in military units.
This includes a dedicated international Tabur – the International Freedom Battalion – people at home have probably seen some of the great pictures from their English-speaking ‘Bob Crow Brigade’.
Due to language barriers, and the
difficulties of travelling here and finding a placement where one can be
useful, there aren’t that many international volunteers in civil
society. Hopefully this will get easier as time goes on. At the moment
if people want to volunteer here they should think about what skills
they have or can get before they travel. For example, if people are
interested then training up to be an ESL (English as a secondary
language) teacher is a great way of being useful here as the demand for
lessons is very high.
What do you think the presence of international volunteers adds to the movement?
Sometimes specific skills which are
in high demand here, medical staff for instance. If not, at the very
least volunteers work as a link between Rojava and the rest of the
world. The people here know they aren’t alone and the rest of the world
gets to find out a little more about what is happening. This is
obviously a big responsibility for those with the ability to report back
and portray an entire revolution based on their experiences. Those of
us doing this need to try to be honest about what we’ve seen, what we
think, and the limits of our personal experience.
It’s not surprising but it is
disappointing to see criticisms of the majority of volunteers as
‘orientalist adventurers’, ‘closet islamophobes’, or ‘fantasists with a
hero complex’ which have arisen in some parts of the left. Whilst a few
people do fit this bill, most volunteers – especially politically active
comrades who have responded to calls to volunteer – aren’t like this at
all. The YPG is also now taking steps to filter those kinds of
volunteers out. It’s quite astonishing how even what I’d call an
uncontroversial historical value of the communist movement –
internationalism – is coming under fire from those who also see
themselves as part of the left. It feels like there are more left
volunteers from pre-existing structures here now, or perhaps they are
just using media channels more effectively. Either way, hammering home
the point that this is a progressive struggle which is demanding the
support of the international left and which sees itself as part of an
international movement is massively important and is a political task we
can all be involved with.
What do you think has been the most significant impact of the revolution so far?
For the people of the region the
revolution has liberated them from the domination of the Assad regime
and Isis. It has also made massive progress in terms of women’s
liberation and direct democracy. Internationally the revolution has
given a massive boost to the struggles north of the border in Bakur and
Turkey and to revolutionaries further afield. Although we need to be
cautious, there are many lessons we can learn from this revolution. At
the very least Rojava serves as a reminder that revolution is always a
possibility where revolutionaries are organised, committed and prepared
to risk their lives.
Any final comments?
The revolution here does not map onto
the perfect fantasy of some revolutionaries in the west. It wasn’t the
spontaneous uprising of the overwhelming majority of the people, they
haven’t abolished the state (if that is ever possible) or capitalism,
and there are still problems to be solved. Despite the fact that this
isn’t full communism right here and right now, this revolution needs to
be applauded and supported. Like all revolutions, this one has not
emerged fully formed but is being built on the fly in the face of much
opposition. Unlike many revolutions this one is quite hard to define:
labels like ‘anarchist’ or ‘stateless revolution’ obscure more than they
reveal. What we do know is that this revolution is pushing forward
forms of popular democracy, women’s liberation and some form of
solidarity economy. Life in Rojava is better for more people than most
parts of the Middle East.
For those afraid of revolutionaries
having real power to make change rather than maintaining ‘resistance’
forever, I’d like to quote Murray Bookchin (whose influence on the
struggle here is definitely overstated in certain quarters).:
“Anarchists may call for the
abolition of the state, but coercion of some kind will be necessary to
prevent the bourgeois state from returning in full force with unbridled
terror. For a libertarian organisation to eschew, out of misplaced fear
of creating a ‘state’, taking power when it can do so with the support
of the revolutionary masses is confusion at best and a total failure of
nerve at worst.”
Those taking an ultra-left position
on Rojava, and rejecting it out of hand, show us more about the
weaknesses of their own politics than of the revolution taking place
here. A real revolution is a mass of contradictions which must be fought
through. That the revolution is doing that here without resorting to
the dictatorship of one political party makes this a particularly
important revolution for the libertarian left to be supporting.
There are more ways for the left to
express solidarity with Rojava, and the wider struggle it is part of
here in the region, than writing articles or sharing things on Facebook.
Getting information out about what is happening here is important of
course, but the obligations for political organisations who support the
revolution here, and who have the capacity, must be much higher. For
example in the UK Plan C’s Rojava solidarity cluster works with
Kurdish-led structures organising discussions and demonstrations, has
raised money for things like a school bus and medical supplies, and is
now sending volunteers for civil work.
There are a few hardworking Kurdish
solidarity groups in the UK also doing great work. When compared to
long-running solidarity campaigns, like the Palestinian solidarity
campaigns for instance, Kurdish solidarity campaigns are still in their
infancy in the UK. The massive intensification of Turkey’s
counterrevolutionary role both within its state borders and beyond,
potentially spilling into Iraq this year, make this solidarity even more
important. Effective national solidarity structures need to be
established or joined, and federated together internationally. It’s a
bit cliched but we can’t forget the slogan ‘solidarity isn’t a word,
it’s a weapon’.
Peter Loo is a member of Plan C and is active in its Rojava solidarity cluster. His statement is here. His other most recent report can be read here.
* ‘Rojava’ is used instead of the
Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria – the area’s official title –
as both a shorthand and as the name many in the west are more familiar
with.
Δευτέρα 30 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019
Abdullah Öcalan on the return to social ecology
Abdullah Öcalan on the return to social ecology
“Humans gain in value when they understand that animals and plants
are only entrusted to them. A social ‘consciousness’ that lacks
ecological consciousness will inevitably corrupt and disintegrate”.
Just as the system has led the social crisis into chaos, so has the
environment begun to send out S.O.S. signals in the form of
life-threatening catastrophes. Cancer-like cities, polluted air, the
perforated ozone layer, the rapidly accelerating extinction of animal
and plant species, the destruction of forests, the pollution of water by
waste, piling up mountains of rubbish and unnatural population growth
have driven the environment into chaos and insurrection. It’s all about
maximum profit, regardless of how many cities, people, factories,
transportation, synthetic materials, polluted air and water our planet
can handle. This negative development is not fate. It is the result of
an unbalanced use of science and technology in the hands of power. It
would be wrong to hold science and technology responsible for this
process. Science and technology in themselves are not to blame. They
function according to the forces of the social system. Just as they can
destroy nature, they can heal it. The problem is exclusively a social
one. There is a great contradiction between the level of science and
technology and the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of
people. This situation is the result of the interests of a minority that
has control over science and technology. In a democratic and free
society, however, science and technology will play an ecological role.
Ecology itself is also a science. It examines the relationship of
society to its environment. Although it is still a very young science,
it will play a leading role in overcoming the contradiction between
society and nature together with all other sciences. The environmental
consciousness that has already been developed in places will make a
revolutionary leap forward through ecology understood in this way. The
bond between the communal primitive society and nature is like the bond
between child and mother. Nature is understood as something alive. The
golden rule of the religion of this time was not to do anything against
it in order not to be punished by it. The natural religion is the
religion of the communal primitive society. There is no contradiction to
nature, no anomaly in the emergence of society. Philosophy itself
defines the human being as “nature becoming aware of itself”. The human
being is basically the most developed part of nature. This proves the
unnaturalness and anomaly of this social system, which puts the most
developed part of nature in contradiction to it. The fact that this
social system has turned the human, who enthusiastically united himself
with nature in feasts, into such a plague for nature shows that it is
itself the plague. The holistic nature of human and the natural
environment does not only refer to economic and social issues. It is
also an indispensable philosophical passion to understand nature. This
is actually based on reciprocity. Nature proves its great curiosity and
creative power by becoming human. The human being, on the other hand,
recognizes itself by understanding nature. It is remarkable that the
Sumerian word for freedom, “Amargi”, means return to the mother –
nature. Between human being and nature there is a quasi love
relationship. This is a great love story. To destroy this love is,
religiously speaking, a mortal sin. Because you cannot create a greater
sense of meaning than this one. In this context, the remarkable
significance of our interpretation of the female bleeding is shown once
again. It is both a sign of the distance from nature and of its origin.
The woman’s naturalness stems from her closeness to nature. This is also
the real meaning of her mysterious attraction.
No social system
that is not in harmony with nature can claim rationality and morality
for itself. Therefore, the system that is most at odds with nature will
also be overcome in terms of rationality and morality. As can be seen
from this brief definition of the contradiction between the capitalist
social system and its present chaotic state and the catastrophic
destruction of the environment, it is a dialectical relationship. The
fundamental contradiction to nature can only be overcome by turning away
from the system. It cannot be solved by environmental protection
movements alone. On the other hand, an ecological society also requires a
moral change. The amorality of capitalism can only be overcome by an
ecological approach. The connection between morality and conscience
demands an empathetic and sympathetic spirituality. This in turn only
makes sense if it is based on ecological competence. Ecology means
friendship with nature, belief in natural religion. In this respect
ecology stands for a renewed, conscious and enlightened union into a
natural, organic society.
Also the practical problems of an
ecological way of life are quite topical. One of the tasks of the
activists is to expand the many existing organizations in every respect
and to make them an integral part of democratic society. This also
includes solidarity with the feminist and liberal women’s movements. One
of the most important activities in democratisation is the promotion
and organisation of environmental awareness. Just as there once was a
pronounced class or national consciousness, we must create an awareness
of democracy and the environment through intensive campaigns. Whether we
are talking about animal rights, the protection of forests or
reforestation, such actions, if carried out properly, are indispensable
elements of social actionism. For people who have no feeling for the
biological can only have a disturbed social feeling.
Those who
perceive the relationship between the two can feel true and with all
their senses. Nature, which has so far been plundered and exposed, must
and will witness a great struggle to restore its cover of flora and
fauna. The forest will have to be given a chance again. “Great
patriotism means reforestation and planting trees.” This is a valuable
slogan.
Those who do not love and protect animals will also not
be able to protect and love humans. Man gains value when he understands
that animals and plants are only entrusted to him. A social
“consciousness” that lacks ecological consciousness will inevitably
corrupt and disintegrate, as was seen in real socialism. Ecological
consciousness is a fundamental ideological consciousness. It resembles a
bridge between philosophy and morality. A policy that promises
salvation from the current crisis can only lead to a real social system
if it is ecological. As with the problem of women’s freedom, the
patriarchal and etatist understanding of power also contributes to the
fact that ecological problems have been delayed for so long and have
still not been solved properly. If ecology and feminism continue to
develop, the patriarchal and etatist system becomes completely out of
balance. The true struggle for democracy and socialism will only become a
complete affair when it takes up the cause of women’s freedom and
nature’s salvation. Only such a complete struggle for a new social
system can lead to a meaningful way out of the current chaos.
The text is an excerpt from Abdullah Öcalan’s defense pamphlet “Bir Halkı Savunmak” (engl: “Beyond State, Power and Violence”.)
Τετάρτη 25 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019
Κυριακή 4 Αυγούστου 2019
PKK’s intervention in Shengal
PKK’s intervention in Shengal
The PKK intervention is in such a way that won’t allow for further
massacres or genocides against the Yazidi people who have suffered 73
genocides.
- ANF
- NEWS DESK
- Saturday, 3 Aug 2019, 14:00
The whole world watched the Shengal genocide as if it was
a movie. Unfortunately, nobody took action to stop this massacre. There
was an absolute humanitarian tragedy. Yazidis (Êzidîs) experienced the
greatest trauma of recent history. On the fifth anniversary of the
Shengal massacre, there is still a need for this massacre to be analyzed
in all aspects and brought to light still. Was the reason for the 73
genocides, the inhuman cruelty and genocide just that the Yazidis have a
different faith? What other factors are at play? Who are attacking
Yazidis, and why? Who has how much responsibility? These questions need
to be asked and answered.
Siba Şêx Xidir and Til Zerê residential areas were attacked by
explosive laden trucks on August 14, 2007 and there was a massacre. The
perpetrators of this massacre and their motives still haven’t been
brought to light. It shouldn’t be ignored that the attacks were based on
political interests as much as a difference in faith. Like in August
2014 the KDP, responsible for defending Yazidis in the ISIS massacre,
failed to carry out this duty and caused a social tragedy, they had a
political responsibility in the massacre of August 2007. Not only a
political responsibility, they had knowledge of and a role in the
planning and execution of this massacre. It was revealed that the
Turkish MİT was involved in this massacre. Shengal and thus Yazidis have
been used as pawns for politics.
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE MASSACRE LAID IN 2007
A new constitution was drafted in post-Saddam Iraq in 2003. According
to article 140 in this constitution, conflicted areas were to hold
referendums to determine their status. The referendum planned for 2007
was to determine whether the line from Makhmur to Shengal, including
Kirkuk, was to be under the Iraqi central government or the Kurdistan
regional government. As Shengal was attacked with explosive laden trucks
before the referendum, the vote could not be held and the fate of these
conflicted areas was not clarified. Defining the August 2007 massacre
without establishing its ties to the referendum would be obscuring the
truth. A massacre scenario was devised and it was enacted by those whose
plans for the referendum failed. The Yazidis were chosen as victims in
this. KDP used this massacre as an excuse to fortify their own area of
influence. Shengal was officially under the Mosul province, but in
effect it came under control of the Kurdistan regional government. This
in sum is the political play over the deaths of over 500 Yazidis. Who
carried out the massacre is just a detail. If the massacres of Siba Şeyh
Xidir and Tilezer are to be analyzed correctly, they should be
considered in relation to the future of Shengal and the referendum.
The Yazidi genocide in Shengal in August 2014 is similar. The ISIS
gangs attacking Mosul is the fruit of the same political tree. They
wanted to balance symbolic Kurdish presidency, a symbolic Sunni
parliament chair post and a strong and effective Shia Iraqi
administration with ISIS. The Shia Iraqi government and Iran, gaining
more and more influence, were to be restricted with ISIS against the
growth of Shiaism in Iraq. It is the self-expression of the Sunni block
through ISIS. The Turkish state, KDP and some Arab countries, and
primarily the residue from Saddam, are the collective of accomplices.
SHENGAL WAS HANDED OVER, LIKE MOSUL WAS HANDED OVER TO ISIS
The gang group that assumed the name the Islamic State of Iraq and
Sham targets mostly different faith groups and Kurds. Breaking the PKK
control in the lands ISIS targets and eliminating the Kurds influenced
by the PKK would serve ISIS in gaining territory, would allow the
Turkish state some comfort and would push the KDP forth as a model. It
would also serve to break the influence of Shiaism in Iraq. This is the
politics of interest that birthed this monstrosity. ISIS attempted to
advance by burning and destroying everything that crossed their path -
until they were stopped in Kobanê. Shengal was handed over the same way
that Mosul was handed over to ISIS. Those who tied their hopes to ISIS’s
advance allowed them to advance quickly. That was why Shengal was left
undefended. The Yazidi society was stuck victimized by political
interests once more. A force making these dirty plans over Shengal and
the Yazidi people claiming to be the conqueror of Shengal and claiming
rights is such a sad contradiction.
PKK WAS THE ONLY FORCE
The states of the world were silently watching the Yazidi genocide in
Shengal, and the PKK was the only force that intervened with the
massacre with their own limited resources. Despite KDP’s obstacles and
arrests against the intervening force, they stood against the ISIS
attacks and prevented the massacre from achieving the ultimate result.
PKK forces defended the Yazidi lands at the price of their lives. They
opened a corridor for the people in the throes of hunger and thirst,
desperate in the scorching desert sun, and removed the Yazidis from the
area. The first intervention was an urgent intervention. It was done to
save the people from the jaws of the beast, so to speak.
Analyzing the PKK’s intervention in Shengal as just stopping the
Yazidi massacre, aiding the Yazidis, defending the Yazidi lands and
transporting the Yazidis through a corridor would be lacking and
insufficient. The PKK has made an intervention that goes beyond all
these.
The PKK’s intervention in Shengal should be analyzed correctly. The
PKK intervention is in such a way that won’t allow for further massacres
or genocides against the Yazidi people who have suffered 73 genocides.
The PKK’s intervention is in such a way that won’t allow for Shengal and
the Yazidis to be sacrificed for political interests ever again.
The time to take advantage of the closed nature of the Yazidi
society, the way they have been left out of politics and without
self-defense, their financial struggles, the insecurity created by the
small size of the population and using the Yazidis as pawns is over.
Yazidis have evolved into a structure that will allow them to defend
themselves and protect themselves against any attacks instead of the
Yazidi people being used in wars as soldiers or peshmerga according to
others’ interests. The youth, the women have organized themselves and
have launched intense efforts to get to a point where they can answer
the needs of the Yazidi society. Yazidis have become a society that
learned to stand on their own without any outside help. It is an
important achievement that they are handling political, military and
diplomatic efforts over the Yazidi people’s organizations. What is
happening in Shengal is a women’s revolution. The self-defense force YBŞ
organizing the military structure and the security forces is no small
feat.
SHENGAL SHOULD BE AUTONOMOUS
The Yazidis are developing their self-government. The assembly
efforts have created a significant experience. They need to be more
institutionalized, assumed as the governing model and go into action.
Whether Shengal is under the Iraqi central government or the Kurdistan
regional government, in any case, it needs to have an autonomous status.
Considering the facts that the threat against Shengal is not completely
removed and that it was a conflicted area and part of the Article 140,
there is still a long way to go. But despite everything, the Yazidis are
going through a process where they learn by doing, and do by learning.
The fortune and the history of the Yazidis have changed.
DIRTY TRICKS
The PKK’s intervention in Shengal is geared towards building a new
social system. It aims to create a free and political society. Most
recently, a mixed group of gangs have resorted to military force and
attacked Khanasor with Roj Peshmergas and counter units on March 3,
2017. They have murdered some ten of our friends and wounded others.
They opened fire targeting women. Two female friends fell martyr while
dozens of others were wounded. Failing to achieve results via
provocative attempts on Shengal, KDP has resorted to dirtier tricks and
are trying to pressure and intimidate the people. They want to achieve
results via intimidation, arrests and buying people out. If that wasn’t
enough, the Shengal mountain was also targeted by the Turkish state’s
aerial attacks.
All of the Yazidi massacres were carried out during the Ottoman
period. The Yazidis who fled Ottoman genocides and sought refuge in the
Shengal mountain back in the day are now threatened by aerial attacks,
to finish off the survivors of the ISIS massacres.
The partnership between the KDP and the Turkish state over Shengal
has been exposed once more with these attacks. This alliance over
animosity and murder of Yazidis is also a tacit alliance with ISIS.
PKK’s intervention in Shengal is a permanent response to animosity
against the Yazidi people.
Σάββατο 3 Αυγούστου 2019
Αιώνια η ντροπή των χυδαίων εχθρών τού ηρωϊκού ΡΚΚ: το ΡΚΚ έσωσε και οργάνωσε τον λαό των Γεζίντι απέναντι στους θεοκράτες φασίστες.
Επειδή υπήρξαν και υπάρχουν και στην επικράτεια τής Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας ορκισμένοι πολιτικοί και ιδεολογικοί εχθροί τού ηρωϊκού ΡΚΚ, θα τους καλούσαμε αν μπορούσαν να διαβάσουν να μελετήσουν και να μάθουν για τον σωτήριο ρόλο τού ΡΚΚ στην διάσωση και οργάνωση των Γεζίντι απέναντι στους Γενοκτόνους φασίστες τού ISIS, στο άρθρο που αναδημοσιεύσαμε [Αυτοκαθορισμός : Remembering the Şengal genocide].
Έπειτα, αφού σκύψουν το κεφάλι τους και αναλογιστούν τι έχουν πει με το λερωμένο ιδεοληπτικό στόμα τους, ειδικά οι "αυτόνομοι" και οι πολύ "αριστεροί" τού κΚε και των ελληνικών μ-λ, να μάθουν να σέβονται και να μη το "ανοίγουν" χωρίς να ξέρουν και χωρίς να θέλουν να μάθουν την αλήθεια που είναι μια και με την οποία δεν έχουν ούτε θα έχουν ποτέ σχέση.
Ιωάννης Τζανάκος
Remembering the Şengal genocide
Πηγή:
On the path of truth with dynamism of the youth - Nûçe Ciwan
NEWS DESK – When on the
3rd of August 2014 the savage ISIS gangs swept over Şengal, which
counted at that moment of the attack a population of 500 000 people due
to migration, the Yazidi community witnessed with their own eyes how the
Peshmerga of the KDP as well as the soldiers of the Iraqi army all ran
away taking their entire weapons and armaments with them, throwing the
Yazidi population under the bus and leaving them totally unprotected in
the fangs of ferocious ISIS. The ISIS gangs launched their first attacks
together with some local thugs that lived in southern Şengal, on the
village Gir Zerik. Afterwards they aimed at the villages Siba Şêx Xidir,
Rambosî, Til Qeseb, Kocho and Til Benadê.
THE PEOPLE FLED TO THE MOUNTAIN
The
defenceless Yazidis who were left alone to fend for themselves,
struggled with a couple of arms, which they successfully hid from the
KDP. But it was impossible to stand against all the panzers, missiles
and heavy artillery which the gangs had obtained from Mosul. The flight
of the Peshmerga rendered the Yazidis completely desolate and
dispirited, and therefore they headed to Mount Şengal, the last resort.
Hundreds of thousands of Yazidis at all ages were at the mercy of a
calamity and betook themselves desperately to the mountain. The
Peshmerga of the KDP were meanwhile crossing the humanitarian corridor,
which the YPG had opened, to Rojava and rushed from there over back to
South Kurdistan.
“WE WITNESSED TREASON WITH OUR OWN EYES”
One
of the fighters of the Şengal Defense Units (YBŞ) Tîrêj Şengalî
conversed with the ANF on those very moments and said: “When ISIS got
control of Mosul, up to 12000 soldiers that were stationed here assured
us: ‘Şengal is our honour, we will defend it no matter what.’ But they
did not fulfil that promise. They delivered us to the gangs and left us
in the clutches of the genocide. We saw with our very own eyes how they
abandoned these poor women and children and ran off. They betrayed this
people. We have witnessed this treason by ourselves.”
“THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT STARS WERE SHINING”
One
of the fighters of the Women’s Defense Units (YJŞ) Viyan Helabî called
the incidents of the 3rd August 2014 in Şengal a Black Day and stated:
“No matter how much and long we talk, we will never be able to put into
words what really happened there back then. It was a black day. The
whole world was watching minute for minute what barbarity was being done
to the Yazidis. Everything, every step happened in front of the eyes of
the tacit world. Those who fell into the hands of ISIS, were gone for
good. They were either enslaved or slaughtered. But also among those who
fled in masses to the mountain, countless died of thirst and hunger,
whereas others fell from the crags and died. Some people also jumped
from the high cliffs to save themselves from falling into the clutches
of ISIS. Despite all that horror, on that night the stars over Şengal
were sparkling brightly. It was a lucid night. Every moment was
illuminated by the light of the stars. The stars were shining in an
unnatural way. There was a meaning hidden behind that…
THE LIGHT OF HOPE IN MOUNT ŞENGAL
The
ISIS gangs massacred only within the first 24 hours thousands of
Yazidis and kidnapped tens of thousands. Those who managed to get to
Mount Şengal beheld on the mountain a light of hope. The Yazidis who
always fell victims to genocides in the course of history, looked now on
a small group of guerrillas of the HPG standing there in front of them
on Mount Şengal, having taken control of both routes and repelled the
attacks of the ISIS gangs successfully. The guerrillas of the HPG had
taken both routes leading to the mountain under their control with only
some light personal arms and one DsHK, which the Peshmerga left behind
as they were busy running away. The interview of the journalist Hayri
Kızıler, who also left for the mountain as the genocide was taking
place, gave us some impression of how the guerrillas used those personal
rifles in the fight against the ISIS gangs.
AND HOPE GROWS
In
his interview Kızıler gave following account: “The people arrived at
the mountain, and by then the HPG had taken control of the routes. This
was heart relieving, no matter how small. After that a vast unit of YPG
fighters came in and they fought a fierce war of position, until they
managed to get to the Mount Şengal. The next day, following the
statement of the People’s Defense Central Headquarters Commander Murat
Karayilan, a unit of guerrillas fought its way open to mount Şengal step
by step. On the 5th August a local militia force was founded, called
the Şengal Resistance Units. Emplacements were set and on the fifth day
the mountain was secured completely. The HPG unit consisting of 7
guerrillas turned within shortest time into a 2 000 men and women strong
force. On seeing this, the people gained new trust. With the arrival of
the YPG and the HPG, the Yazidi people were filled with tremendous
esperance.”
THE HUMANITARIAN CORRIDOR OF THE YPG AND YPJ
As
news about the genocide were spread, Rojava mobilized to highest
degree. The forces of the YPG and YPJ, who were themselves in Rojava’s
Hesekê in the heat of a great operation against ISIS gangs and their
appendages, left that operation halfway and moved heaven and earth to
get to Şengal over the Til Koçer, Rabia and Jazaa route. The fighters of
the YPG and YPJ opened a way of hundreds of kilometres, giving dozens
of martyrs, and reached Mount Şengal finally on the 8th August. The
fighters of the YPG and YPJ on the mountain guided hundreds of thousands
of Yazidis with the cars of the mobilized inhabitants of Rojava placed
at their disposal through the corridor to Rojava. The global community,
which remained until then completely silent in view of the tragedy the
Yazidi people faced, titled this corridor that has been fought open
fiercely, the “humanitarian corridor”.
“WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO”
One
of the commanders of the Şengal Defense Units (YBŞ) Tîrêj Şengal, who
himself was among the civilians saving themselves through the
“humanitarian corridor” to Rojava and decided to return once again to
Mount Şengal, told ANF about his psychological state back then and the
happenings he witnessed with these words: “We were really completely at a
loss. Then we heard that some of the HPG guerrillas who were stationed
on the mountain had entered the city and wanted to organise the people.
Some of them were even arrested by the KDP. At that time we had crossed
the border to Rojava, but many of us had the deep desire to return to
Mount Şengal and do something, no matter what.”
12 RIDERS OF LEGENDARY DERWÊSHÊ EVDÎ
People’s
Defense Central Headquarters Commander Murat Karayılan stated in an
interview he gave in November 2014, that basing on the warnings of
Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan they wanted to send their forces
to Şengal, Makhmur and Kirkuk and to get on that issue into contact
with the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan).
Karayilan conversed on the diplomacy that were
conducted then as follows: “The KDP asserted that they have got
everything under control, that the Peshmerga units would be totally
sufficient and that there would be no need for the guerrillas”. The PUK
also said the same thing and added that in case they needed help they
would call for us. We, the PKK, are taking matters into our own hands.
And based on this we made some preparations. We mobilized 12 of our
guerrillas to head to Şengal. When I talked with those 12 comrades, I
compared them with the 12 riders of Derwêshê Evdî, a very famous Kurdish
epic, and told them that they will defend Şengal the same way. We sent
those comrades clandestinely to Şengal. When the Peshmerga got wind of
that, they arrested three of our comrades of that group. The nine
remaining guerrillas made their way carefully to their destination. On
the 3rd August at 09:00 o’clock we received news of a catastrophic
dimension and we heard that the Peshmerga had retreated from Şengal one
day before. It was the first time for eight years that I used a phone to
talk with the comrades in Şengal, and that minute we send off a unit of
guerrillas to Şengal.”
“IN EVERY VALLEY AND CANYON WERE CORPSES”
From
here on we leave the talking to the HPG guerrilla Êrîş Hewreman, who
was one of the guerrillas of the “intervention force”: “We were put in
charge as soon as the genocide in Şengal took place in order to rescue
our people there. After we set off from Qandil, we crossed the border to
Rojava and from then headed over the corridor, which the YPG had
secured, to Şengal. As we betook ourselves to Şengal, we came across on
the way many of our Yazidi people that had starved to death and severely
effete children and elderly. A drop of water was a great need. The
valleys and canyons were filled with corpses of those who were massacred
by the ISIS gangs or died of thirst. What infuriated us even more than
the actual abhorrent genocide, was the treason of the KDP, that bragged
to be a Kurdish party”.
YAZIDIS SCATTERED ALL AROUND
The
majority of the Yazidis managed to escape the genocide and reached
Mount Şengal and were then taken to Rojava. Another part went to the
cities of Southern Kurdistan. Those who reached Rojava were accommodated
in the Newroz refugee camp in the Dêrik city. The Yazidi Kurds that
crossed the border to Northern Kurdistan were placed into refugee camps
mostly in the cities of Şırnak, Mardin, Batman and Amed. Some others
headed afterwards, despite all calls of the Yazidi institutions and the
Kurdish people, to Europe.
“YAZIDIS GOT TO KNOW THE PKK”
We
want to listen once more to the words of the HPG guerrilla Êrîş
Hewreman telling of what exactly was done back then and what kind of
resistance was offered: “When the fighters arrived at the area and the
Yazidi youth started to self-organize, the people was loaded up with
great morale. Even though the corridor between Rojava and Şengal was
closed again after some time, the morale did not fade at all. Between
the people and the fighters a strong bond was forged. At the very
beginning the Yazidi people did not know anything about the PKK at all.
But now they have come to understand the PKK thoroughly. At that time
they switched from the defense to offense, inflicting heavy blows to the
enemy. Within a small area they offered a massive resistance 11 months
in a row. It was an unparalleled resistance. The Yazidi community came
to know and love heroes like Pirdoğan, Canfeda and Berxwedan.”
JOINT COMMAND FOR OFFENSIVE
On
the one side a substantial struggle was waged in Şengal against the
ISIS gangs, and on the other side the KDP put all its efforts into
hindering the liberation of Şengal. On 29 October 2015 the Şengal
Defense Units (YBŞ), the Women’s Defense Units (YJŞ) and the Şengal
Defence Forces (HPŞ) issued a joint statement and declared the formation
of a joint command for Şengal’s liberation, called the “Êzîdxan Command
to liberate Şengal”.
COORDINATION BETWEEN YPJ/YPJ AND THE GUERRILLA
On
the border to Rojava the forces of the YPG and YPJ liberated Hawl and
Xatûniyê, providing a great boost to the operations to liberate Şengal.
On the border to Şengal the guerrillas of the HPG and YJA-Star advanced
on the mount Kolik and Geliyê Şîlo and liberated many villages of
Şengal.
LIBERATION OF ÊZÎDXAN
The joint
command that was forged on 29 October, heralded the start of the
“Operation to Liberate Şengal” to the Yazidi community and the people of
Kurdistan. After the operation was launched, the KDP mobilized on the
eastern front to get rid of the bad reputation it had earned with its
withdrawal from Şengal on 3 August. The Yazidi people who remained on
Mount Şengal also took up arms in the framework of self-defence and
joined the operation. Already on the second day of the operation the
forces of the YBŞ and YJŞ and the guerrillas of the HPG and YJA-Star
cleared the city centre of the gangs. The HPG command in Şengal as well
as the general command of the YBŞ issued a statement saying: “We
dedicate the liberated and free Şengal to our people.”
BARZANİ’S DENIAL EFFORTS
Şengal
was freed from the ISIS gangs in front of the eyes of the entire
closely watching world. The president of the KDP Masoud Barzanî however
held a press conference one day after entering Şengal once more and
tried to deny the reality that occurred second for second in front of
the eyes of the world. He claimed that the Şengal town was secured by
his Peshmergas. The fighters of the YBŞ and YJŞ and the guerrillas of
the HPG and YJA-Star immediately went on liberating the villages in the
south, as soon as they cleared the city centre. But the KDP Peshmerga
took their seats in Şengal town centre, settled there and did not move
an inch whatsoever.
Πέμπτη 25 Ιουλίου 2019
Παρασκευή 19 Ιουλίου 2019
Το ερωτικό μήνυμα ενός φίλου..
"...Αγαπητέ
Γιάννη, για την πρώτη και δεύτερη ουσία
στον Αριστοτέλη στα έργα του: α) Κατηγορίαι
2a, 2b. β) Μετά
τα Φυσικά Ζ3...''
Τρίτη 11 Ιουνίου 2019
Σάββατο 8 Ιουνίου 2019
Παρασκευή 31 Μαΐου 2019
Σοσιαλιστική δημοκρατία και έριδα..
Υπάρχουν διάφορες προσπάθειες για την καταγωγική θεμελίωση τής έννοιας τής δημοκρατίας, και δεν προτίθεμαι βέβαια να τις παραθέσω τώρα, αλλά μπορώ να σας δώσω ένα μεζεδάκι για το πως θεωρώ εγώ ότι μπορεί να οριστεί μια νέα σοσιαλιστική μορφή της χωρίς να δεσμεύεται απόλυτα από την οποιαδήποτε καταγωγική θεμελίωση:
Βασικό στοιχείο των ανταγωνιστικών ταξικών κοινωνιών είναι η έριδα και η αγεφύρωτη σύγκρουση μεταξύ ατόμων, κοινωνικών τάξεων και μεταξύ άλλων κοινωνικών ή "ιδεολογικών" ομάδων.
Δεν θεωρώ ότι στον σοσιαλισμό που επιθυμώ θα εκλείψουν οι σκληρές αντιθέσεις, άρα και οι αντιπαραθέσεις μεταξύ ατόμων και κοινωνικών ομάδων, αν και οφείλω να "ξεκαθαρίσω" ότι για μένα δεν νοείται σοσιαλισμός χωρίς να υπάρχει δια αυτού κατάργηση των σχέσεων οικονομικής εκμετάλλευσης και καταπίεσης, χωρίς δηλαδή να υπάρξει κατάργηση τής ύπαρξης μιας ξεχωριστής τάξης ιδιοκτητών των [βασικών] μέσων παραγωγής και των πόρων.
Θα υπάρχουν άλλοι λόγοι σύγκρουσης και αντιπαράθεσης, θα υπάρχουν διαφορετικές γνώμες, διαφορετικές στρατηγικές για την πολιτική, οικονομική ίσως και πολιτισμική "υφή" του σοσιαλισμού.
Δεν θεωρώ ότι αυτοί οι ανταγωνισμοί θα είναι ήπιοι, όπως επίσης δεν θεωρώ ότι υπάρχει κάποια οντολογική διασφάλιση ότι οι συγκρούσεις που θα προκύπτουν από τις αντίθετες στάσεις και γνώμες θα είναι εύκολα αφομοιώσιμες σε ένα εκ των προτέρων διασφαλισμένο ως μη-ανταγωνιστικό κοινωνικό συνεχές.
Απλά το κοινό υπόβαθρο των συγκρούσεων θα είναι διαφορετικό από το κοινό υπόβαθρο στο οποίο έχουμε συνηθίσει να ζούμε ζώντας σε μια ταξική καταπιεστική κοινωνία όπου μια οικονομική ολιγαρχία "κανονίζει" την κοινωνική κανονικότητα σύμφωνα με τα οικεία ιδιοτελή συμφέροντα της και όπου τα υπόλοιπα "μέλη" τής κοινωνίας είναι "αναγκασμένα" να αγωνίζονται συνέχεια, υπό ανταγωνιστικούς όρους, για την ίδια την επιβίωση και αυτοσυντήρηση τους.
Η δημοκρατική απάλειψη των καταπιεστικών εκμεταλλευτικών όρων τής κοινωνικής παραγωγής, εν συντομία η υπέρβαση τού καπιταλιστικού αλλά και του κρατικιστικού τρόπου παραγωγής, θεωρώ όμως ότι θα φέρει ένα είδος δημοκρατικής ειρήνευσης, χωρίς να σημαίνει κατάργηση κάθε είδους ανταγωνισμού και σύγκρουσης.
Οι ποικίλες διατομικές και κοινωνικές συγκρούσεις θα συνεχίζονται σε ένα άλλο πλαίσιο, αλλά νομίζω ότι εντός τής σοσιαλιστικής δημοκρατίας θα εκλείψει η ακρότητα αυτών των συγκρούσεων, η αβυσσαλέα έκρηξή τους όπως λόγου χάριν παράγεται αναπόφευκτα από το ακραίο υλικό πλαίσιο ζωής των εργαζόμενων πολιτών μιας σύγχρονης καπιταλιστικής δημοκρατίας.
Η εικόνα ενός τέτοιου είδους σοσιαλιστικού δημοκρατισμού μάς ωθεί ή πρέπει να μας ωθήσει να αναθεωρήσουμε την μορφή και το περιεχόμενο τού μέχρι τώρα επαναστατισμού ή δημοκρατισμού μας, σε σχέση μάλιστα με όσα είπαμε στην αρχή.
Οι δημοκρατίες των ταξικών κοινωνιών [όταν υπήρξανε ή όπως υπάρχουν] δεν παύουν να είναι δημοκρατίες, δεν θεωρώ άρα ότι υπάρχει μια εντελώς "μη καταγωγική" θεμελίωση των σοσιαλιστικών δημοκρατικών προτύπων μας, αλλά ταυτόχρονα η δημοκρατία που θέλουμε να υπάρξει ως εργατική δημοκρατία πρέπει να κομίζει ένα νέο ιδιαίτερο στοιχείο που αφορά σε αυτήν την νέα μη-εριστική ή μη-απόλυτα εριστική και μη-δικηγορίστικη έκφραση και ουσία της.
Μέχρι τώρα ο δημοκρατισμός των εργαζόμενων πολιτών πιθήκιζε τον δημοκρατικό Λόγο των ρητόρων-δικηγόρων των ταξικών και ενδοταξικών συγκρούσεων των ταξικών δημοκρατιών, όπως διαμορφώνονταν και διαμορφώνεται [ως Λόγος] μέσα σε ένα πραγματικό ή φαντασιακό πεδίο μιας πραγματικής ή φαντασιακής ιστορικής δίκης.
Η έριδα και η εριστικότητα παρουσιάζονταν ως ο μοναδικός τρόπος τής δημοκρατικής σοφιστικής.
Τίποτα από όλα αυτά δεν πρόκειται να εκλείψει, οι αντιθέσεις και οι συγκρούσεις δεν θα λείψουν, αλλά υπάρχει ωστόσο ανάγκη να ανακαλύψουμε [πέραν των αστικών ή μικροαστικών "ευγενειών"] την ευγένεια τού σοσιαλιστικού ήθους, όπως τούτο θα προκύπτει [και] από τις συνεργατικές και συντροφικές σοσιαλιστικές παραγωγικές σχέσεις.
Ιωάννης Τζανάκος
Πέμπτη 23 Μαΐου 2019
Ibrahim Kaypakkaya on the Kurdish National Question
Πηγή: dazibao rojo
Ibrahim Kaypakkaya on the Kurdish National Question
The following text is excerpted from a lengthy polemic by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya entitled The National Question in Turkey. This work was originally completed in December 1971, before Ibrahim Kaypakkaya led the genuine Marxist-Leninists in splitting with the Shafak revisionists, who were also
The
excerpts printed here are translated from a collection entitled
Selected Writings, Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, which was published by Ocak
Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1979. AWTW
2. Who is subjected to national oppression?
According
to the Shafak revisionists, it is the Kurdish people who
are being subjected to national oppression. This fails to grasp
what national oppression means. National oppression is the oppression
to which the ruling classes of the dominant nation subject the oppressed,
dependent and minority nations. In Turkey, national oppression is
the oppression by the ruling classes of the dominant Turkish nation
not just of the Kurdish people but of the entire Kurdish nation,
and not even of the Kurdish nation alone, but of all minority
nationalities.
Who is Ibrahim Kaypakkaya?
Πηγή:
Ibrahim Kaypakkaya – Selected Works
Who is Ibrahim Kaypakkaya?
İbrahim Kaypakkaya (1949 – May 18, 1973) was a major leader of the Communist movement in Turkey. He was the founder of the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML).
Following the military memorandum of 1971,
the Turkish government cracked down on the Communist movement in Turkey
and was successful in destroying the machinery of the TKP/ML.
Kaypakkaya and several of his colleagues were arrested. Kaypakkaya died
in prison in 1973 after being tortured for over 4 months and later being
shot in the head by his interrogators.
He
is revered by his admirers today as a symbol of resistance, who
describe him as an aggregator of the ideas and traits of other major
leaders and thinkers in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
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