“A real revolution is a mass of contradictions”

In October 2016 Peter Loo travelled to Rojava* to volunteer as an English teacher and participate in work within civil society – the outcome of over 14 months of organising within the Plan C Rojava solidarity cluster. He is currently working for the SYPG campaign in Qamishlo. As well as directly offering his skills Peter has been able to visit places in Rojava and speak to many people as the future of Rojava, and Syria in general, continues to hang in the air. This interview took place late in December 2016. First published on Novara.

Hi Peter, we’ve got lots of questions about your experiences so far but perhaps you could explain a little about the history to date for some readers who might not know too many of the details.

Well, we should start by briefly talking about the origins of the revolution. Many people skip over this part but it is vital to understanding the dynamics of the whole revolution. The Democratic Union party (PYD) who led the revolution have been active in northern Syria/western Kurdistan (Rojava is the Kurmanji word for west) since 2003. Before them the Workers’ party of Kurdistan (PKK), who the PYD are affiliated to, were permitted by the regime to use the region as a base to organise against the Turkish state until they were ejected in 1998.

The first protests against [Syrian president Bashar al-] Assad started in early 2011 and by the spring the PYD had begun to focus effort into organising the Kurdish community, forming local committees and armed self-defence units (the precursors to the YPG and female YPJ forces). This was to be the social basis for the revolution. In the middle of July in 2012, as the social movement against Assad turned into a bloody military conflict involving many international powers, these self-defence forces, bolstered by PKK-trained guerrillas, evicted the regime from several towns and cities in the north. The PYD’s defence forces took control of major roads and evicted the regime forces from key infrastructure sites with very few clashes or casualties.

The uprising had a distinct geography: areas with a predominant Kurdish population where the PYD had been organising were the ones to rise up and eject the regime forces. In areas without an overwhelming Kurdish majority, Assad’s forces managed to maintain a presence. Here in Qamishlo, where an estimated 20% of the population support the regime, there was some heavy fighting but the regime managed to hold onto many of the public buildings. July 2012 marks the emergence of Rojava as a distinct force in the Syrian conflict. The cantons which were formed declared themselves to be against Assad (though arguing that he should be removed through elections not force), yet not a part of the rapidly fragmenting constellation of Syrian rebels. The relationship between Rojava and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – the military forces initially formed by the rebels – is a complicated one and there have been examples of both co-operation and conflict between Rojava and different parts of the FSA since the beginning of the revolution.

This account of the origins of the revolution as an insurrection is contested by those more critical of the Rojava revolution and its refusal to join the wider uprising against Assad. Most publicly in the UK these critics include Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami, the authors of Burning Country. In this book, which only briefly touches on Rojava, the authors argue the withdrawal of Assad’s forces was “apparently co-ordinated” with the PYD, whose coming to power was a fait accompli, agreed beforehand with the regime in order to free troops up from guard duty to fight the rebels elsewhere. These two narratives (fait accompli or successful insurrection) clash and I don’t have a definite answer – perhaps things will become clearer in the next few months as the future of Rojava’s relationship with the regime becomes apparent. However the fait accompli argument doesn’t explain why there were military casualties in the initial days, nor why hostilities continue sporadically. A conspiracy doesn’t seem that likely. Rather, [it’s likely that] recognising the political reality in Rojava had changed with the insurrection, Assad renegotiated his political position with regards to this part of Syria, possibly keeping his options open in the long term.

From this beginning the revolution has expanded geographically – two of its three cantons are directly connected (Kobane and Cizire cantons), and fighting continues to connect these to Efrin canton – and also socially. A political system based around decentralisation (the confederal system) and the construction of local-level ‘communes’ has been instituted, an economic system which prioritises co-operatives and provides for the people’s basic needs is in place, and a massive shift in gender relations is under way. This is one of the most exciting political struggles being undertaken in the world today both in terms of its scale and scope, made all the more impressive given the conflict continuing to unfold in Syria and the hostility it faces from neighbouring countries.

We’ll come back to the revolution’s relationship with the regime later on. So the revolution began as a PYD-led movement, primarily supported by Kurds?

Exactly. After what we could call the insurrectionary phase of the revolution – removing the regime from effective control – the next phase was one of political consolidation and the implementation of a political programme. This programme has three central planks: a system of grassroots democracy (which exists in a relationship with formal political parties and some form of representative system) which goes under the name of democratic confederalism, a women’s revolution, and an ecological programme (by far the least developed aspect at the moment). Building support for this programme beyond both the PYD and the Kurdish community were the immediate tasks of the revolution.

celebration of the anniversary of the confederal system.

Many smaller political parties are now an active part of the revolution, working together beneath the umbrella of TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society). But obviously not everyone is supportive of what is happening. ENKS, a coalition of 16 parties dominated by Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government (KRG) of Iraq, has been a vocal opponent of many of the developments here in Rojava. Barzani does not share the political vision of the PYD, modelling KRG on oil states like Dubai, and is currently implementing a full embargo on Rojava alongside his ally Turkey which is causing all kinds of problems. Because of these tensions Carl Drott from the University of Oxford has argued that “sometimes it seems that the only consistent policy of the KCN [ENKS] is to oppose anything that the PYD does.”

More importantly the revolution has prioritised gaining the trust and support of all the communities here in Rojava. These communities (Arab, Syriac, Chechen, Armenian, Turkmen, etc.) are participating in increasing numbers as time goes on and they see the ideas of the revolution – and its benefits – put into practice as well as seeing that the regime isn’t coming back. The reasons for supporting the revolution vary from the more politically motivated, such as a desire for a free Kurdistan or a belief in the politics of [the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah] Öcalan and his vision of confederalism, to the less abstract desire for peace, security and the provision of basic services which the revolution is providing. The YPG and YPJ are pretty much universally loved here and this support has extended to the military alliance – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – they have built with other progressive militias (of different ethnicities) in the region.

The revolution began from within the Kurdish community and work to build support for it within other communities is a central priority. This includes working with the thousands of Arab refugees fleeing the conflict in the rest of Syria who are being blocked from travelling to Europe by the Turkish state. Part of my work with TEV-DEM here centres around building this support across communities. The Syriac community, for example, is starkly divided between the regime and revolution, with each faction possessing its own military and police units. Passing through the Syriac neighbourhoods these division are quite clear, one street full of portraits of Assad and the regime’s flag, the next containing pro-revolution checkpoints with revolutionary slogans on the walls.

Let’s tackle the thorny question of the relationship between the regime and the PYD. In short, what’s going on?

Well, as I said earlier, the revolution didn’t kick the regime out everywhere. Here in Qamishlo, the regime still has a presence. When Aleppo was ‘liberated’ recently for example, there were loud, noisy celebrations for Assad’s victory in some neighbourhoods and the regime still pays the salaries of some civil servants like teachers. Occasionally clashes break out in the cities where the regime still has a presence such as Qamishlo and Hasseke.

As I said earlier the revolution here has constituted itself as a force independent of the wider rebel movement against Assad (itself very diverse). It has relied on the support of international social movements, progressive political parties, and also most controversially on the support of large states such as the USA and (at times) Russia. These have to some extent prevented Assad or, more likely at the moment, the Turkish state from outright crushing them, but the situation is still perilous. With regards to the regime, it’s unclear at the moment how the regime will orientate itself towards Rojava and vice-versa. At the moment, neither side has the outright military strength to easily defeat the other. With the defeat of the rebels basically being assured with the re-occupation of Aleppo this might all change. For example, the YPG and YPJ in the large Kurdish neighbourhood of Aleppo, Sheiq Maqsoud, who defended it from rebel attacks (and also aided Assad’s forces at some points in the fighting) have now pulled out, only leaving Asayish (armed police) in the neighbourhood.

This ‘relationship’ with the regime has been criticised by many. At the start of the Syrian uprising the potential for a broader alliance between Kurds and Arabs seemed possible but failed for a variety of reasons. These include a latent Arab chauvinism, a by-product of decades of colonial rule in Rojava by the regime which was one factor in the unwillingness of both the regime and the rebels to see Kurdish autonomy established. The rise to pre-eminence of Islamist forces on the rebel side also blocked a wide-scale alliance between the Rojava revolution and the rebels. Alliances have been made with forces in the regions that make up the cantons, the SDF for example, but a broad alliance with the larger factions on the rebel side did not come about. This missed alliance, if it was ever possible, has probably significantly shaped the outcome of the rest of the conflict.

We have seen a rapid expansion of the Rojava cantons, particularly into areas with a sizeable Arab population. Could you tell us about your experiences of how the different ethnic groups are accommodated into the revolution, and how it has been received?

Since 2015 the areas controlled by the cantons have expanded massively through their offensives against Isis. It’s undeniable that one reason for this is to build a continuous, connected system of cantons. These offensives, by a primarily Kurdish military into primarily Arab areas, have thrown up some problems. I had the opportunity to visit the front at Salouk in December. As the Raqqa offensive pushed the front lines further forward people were being allowed to return to their villages. In the main the villagers I met seemed broadly supportive of the SDF forces they came into contact with. However, not all the villagers support what is happening – many, we were told, had been or still were supporters of Isis. We visited one Tabur (military unit) which had been the victim of a suicide attack earlier in the year; the attacker was a frequent visitor from the village next door. 

As the area controlled by the confederal system has expanded, changes have taken place to accommodate the increasing numbers of non-Kurdish participants. I’ve mentioned the SDF as a multi-ethnic military coalition, which marked a positive step forward for the revolution. The current official name of the region, the Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria, is an indication of the multi-ethnic project the revolution is trying to build. We saw one of the co-chairs of the confederal system, Mansur Salem, who is a Syrian arab, speak a while back and he was stressing how building this multi-ethnic support is a key political challenge for the revolution.

To what extent is the ideology of the revolution in Rojava being taken up by ordinary people?

Visitors arriving in Rojava expecting some kind of transcendental revolutionary experience will be disappointed. Given the amazing work that is happening, and all the great media being produced for western audiences this isn’t surprising, but beyond the front the way the revolution is manifesting itself can often be quite subtle or even not as developed as one might expect or hope.

I’ve already mentioned the fact that spreading the values of the revolution into other communities is a work in progress. As another example, whilst the higher levels of the confederal system, especially in cities, are well developed, the lowest level, the commune – a neighbourhood level institution in which the most direct participation in political assemblies and politically-themed committees takes place – is not as widespread as one might think from the outside. The reasons for this come back to the origins and dynamics of the insurrectionary phase of the revolution as discussed earlier. Counterintuitively, we have the higher levels of this political system actively trying to expand the grassroots level of political participation. Lots of work is taking place to expand the numbers of communes numerically and geographically. It requires finding physical resources and educating people in the local community about the values of the revolution and the way the (sometimes complicated) systems work here. But perhaps the most visible element of the revolution is the role of women in society here.

That was going to be my next question. The image often projected of the revolution emphasises women’s liberation and the role of the YPJ in leading the call to change gender relations. How much does this impact on daily life in Rojava, and is it really such a fundamental part of the movement?

A criticism from the left in Europe, as exemplified in a recent article by Gilles Dauvé, is that the women’s revolution in Rojava is limited to the women in the YPJ. If it were then Rojava could not be seen to be having a women’s revolution. After all, the Israeli state conscripts female soldiers and [Muammar] Gaddafi was famous for having female bodyguards. History is littered with examples of women playing a significant role in social struggles or military conflicts, only to be returned to subservient social positions at the ending of hostilities. But this isn’t where the women’s revolution stops here in Rojava. Neither does it stop at the point of ensuring 40% women’s representation in all committees and an equality of speaking roles (alone a step beyond most western states).

Underpinning all these clearly visible outcomes is the slow, patient development of the women’s political movement: political education for women to develop their skills and build the confidence of future organisers, forms of (re)education and intervention against abusive men, the activity of women’s committees at all levels of the confederal system, and the tireless work of the Kongreya Star (star congress) – the organised expression of the women’s movement here.

Once again, this isn’t a problem-free process; these changes are being built upon a hugely conservative society where violence against women, honour killings, forced marriage, an incredibly huge pay differential, as well as the more humdrum features of patriarchy were all extremely common before the revolution. The movement is working hard to bring everyone with them, to be firm and take immediate action where needed or to take a more long-term approach where this is more effective.

Like everything here, it shares many features with western movements but retains many differences. The political underpinnings of the women’s movement here are collectively called Jineology, which means the science of women. Öcalan is, unsurprisingly, a key jineological theorist and has laid out a broad argument about the historical roots of patriarchy which overcame a peaceful matriarchal society. Capitalism is seen as inherently patriarchal and Öcalan, who is once again the key reference point for the movement, argues “the need to reverse the role of man is of revolutionary importance.”

First young women’s conference in Cizire canton.

But some parts of this theory will be more problematic for some feminists in the west. For example, the Jineological approach to gender seems to be an essentialist one where definite characteristics are assigned to the genders. Queer feminists will find this ideology quite challenging. The politics of sexuality are also quite different than in the west, for cadre sexual relations are pretty much forbidden and in the rest of society there is a strong emphasis on abstinence until marriage. In many interviews when queer sexuality is raised the standard answer seems to be something along the lines of ‘we’ve never met a gay person in Rojava before’. However this is something which will hopefully be addressed as time goes on, and I’ve heard reports of public lectures on LGBT politics taking place in some areas.

That’s a good point about Jineology not mapping onto western feminism directly. Could this be said about Apoist movements in general?

Yeah, definitely. Lots of debates about the PKK built on answering the question ‘are they an anarchist organisation?’ have gone around in circles because they have failed to actually analyse the movement itself. In the same way the PKK was never a straightforward Marxist-Leninist organisation historically, it isn’t an anarchist movement today. The PKK and its sister organisations self-define as ‘Apoist’ – a movement built around Abdullah Öcalan and his, well, quite eclectic work. The movements based on his political vision are contradictory, especially since the development of the ‘new paradigm’ since Öcalan’s arrest in 1999. This paradigm significantly changed many parts of the PKK’s political vision. Although the PKK has now formally renounced the desire for an independent Kurdish state and replaced it with its model of democratic confederalism, it is still a hierarchical movement with strict discipline for cadre and a cult of personality around Öcalan himself. Its conception of revolution doesn’t map onto those conceptions held by classical revolutionary movements, being:

“…neither the anarchist idea of abolishing the whole state immediately, nor the communist idea of taking over the whole state immediately. Over time we will organise alternatives to each part of the state run by the people, and when they succeed, that part of the state dissolves.”

Quite importantly its critique of capitalism, or capitalist modernity in its own terminology, whilst quite opaque (an opacity which isn’t helped by the lack of movement works translated into English) certainly isn’t as fundamental as those coming from the Marxist tradition. Whilst the Apoist movement corresponds with many of the values of socialist and anarchist traditions it is something distinct and different.

There was an article by two other international volunteers who self-define as anarchists on the Plan C website a short while ago. The article makes some useful and important points about the complicated practicalities of showing solidarity here and for that it should definitely be read. They make the (uncontroversial) point that working in Rojava is not neutral. The choices of who and how we work with here will strengthen some groups, individuals and dynamics rather than others, and we need to be aware of this.

I read this as making the implicit argument common to many on the anti-authoritarian left to support the people or the social movements rather than organised parties. A particular problem with that perspective here is that the Apoist movement has transcended the boundaries of its political parties and is also a mass social movement with elements of self-organisation beyond the parties. I’d argue that the revolutionary left needs to be supporting the PYD and Apoist movements across the Middle East rather than some loosely defined, potentially fictitious unaligned ‘people’. They are a very large, possibly the largest, progressive force in the Middle East and a large part of their politics resonate strongly with our own. Demonstrating a serious commitment to real solidarity work, which once it moves beyond writing articles starts to become very challenging, helps to build the platform from which to engage in discussion with these movements. There are parts of the Apoist vision which I’d love to critically debate with them (for instance definitions and critiques of capitalism) but this will probably only happen meaningfully when one can demonstrate a track record of sorts.   

Going back to the communes, how important are they?

At the local level they are important for solving small problems, highlighting big ones, and function as the most local transmission belt of the ideas of the revolution. As well as running the local meetings and committees, the lower levels of the system serve as centres to mobilise people for self-defence or for demonstrations and rallies. When we go to political events we usually leave in large convoys of buses from our neighbourhood’s Mala Gel (People’s House – basically a social centre) and when we organise events the local communes are a vital resource for directly connecting with people. I haven’t seen enough of this quite complex system to judge to what extent the ideas from the base of this system are listened to higher up the federal system through the various elected delegates and thematic committees.

It’s quite funny, I met a European Marxist-Leninist here who was convinced the anarchists had got the entire revolution wrong and that the communes had a very peripheral role in what was going on. For him, the revolution was dominated by the PYD with the YPG and YPJ providing the muscle behind it. When he met one of the international Marxist-Leninist parties here doing consistent community work promoting and actually setting up communes his whole attitude completely changed. Perhaps some on the left are a bit optimistic about how developed the commune system is but it definitely exists and is growing, we just shouldn’t confuse our desires with reality.

The Economy Question: One of the most important questions for many on the left is what kind of economy is being built?

Northern Syria was historically deliberately underdeveloped by the Syrian regime and treated like an internal colony. Arab settlers were encouraged to move into the region and alongside the exploitation of oil reserves found in the area, the other main sector, agricultural production, was strictly managed. What is now Efrin canton had its many forests replaced with olive plantations whilst in the 1970s the regime spread the rumour that a particularly vicious tomato blight was spreading from Turkey in order to encourage the conversion of agricultural production in Cizire canton completely to wheat. In winter, driving through the endless empty fields which make up the countryside in Cizire canton is quite a bleak experience. Efforts are now underway to diversify agricultural production for both ecological and economic reasons.

So the revolution did not inherit much in the way of large scale means of production. The few large productive sites that exist have been socialised. I think these are a concrete factory, the oil wells, and, since the Manbij campaign, the Tishrin dam. Here in Qamishlo there are about 60 ‘factories’ with a maximum size of 20 employees. Some of these are private initiatives, some run as co-operatives. The commercial and logistical side of life in Rojava is also on the small scale. When the regime was evicted there was little in the way of large scale logistics systems – transport systems, or the integrated logistics systems large supermarket chains possess – which could be socialised. The tiny rail system is out of commission and the regime holds the airport in Qamishlo, which only hosts an infrequent internal route to Damascus.

In a great interview by Janet Biehl, the adviser for economic development in Cizire canton discusses the ‘three economies’ functioning in parallel in Rojava. You can read about it yourself but in short these are the ‘war economy’, the ‘open economy’ (i.e. the private economy) and the ‘social economy’. At the moment the war economy – subsidised bread and oil for example – dominates with the social economy of co-operatives being pointed out as a future hope. Obviously the danger is if/when the embargo is lifted and private investment is allowed in – especially for expensive infrastructure like oil refineries and heavy industry – that the social economy is completely outcompeted.

I wouldn’t want to venture a prediction about the future of the economy here, though the future challenges seem quite clear, but I can say it’s disappointing that some on the left aren’t supporting what is happening here because of the persistence of private property, commodity production and the wage relation. This is a kind of ‘all or nothing’ purism which often comes from such an abstract place, seemingly removed from an acknowledgement of the difficulties of actual social change. No revolution so far has managed to abolish capitalist relations – let alone in the space of a few years, during an international proxy war, whilst also under embargo! Whilst the Apoist critique of capitalist modernity is certainly not a Marxist one, here in Rojava its economic strategy is broadly a progressive one – albeit with question marks over the future – which deserves our solidarity.

To withhold support because capitalism will still function in some form for the foreseeable future seems short-sighted. It’s interesting that we often support non-communist social struggles right up to the point that they attain the ability to significantly change the world, at which point many of us withdraw our support. We need to take a longer term view of social change which recognises it as a contradictory and complicated process. Just because the revolution here isn’t immediately implementing communism doesn’t mean we shouldn’t support it.

What is the dominant political make-up of international volunteers? What kind of expectations do they come with, and in what ways are those confirmed or subverted?

In general, the people who arrive here are a mixture of the starry eyed and those expecting something a bit more realistic. At one point, based on internet coverage alone, it seemed as if the majority of volunteers were adventurers, well-meaning liberals, or even more right-wing people just here to fight Isis. But whilst this might have been the case at one point it certainly isn’t now. The YPG has noticed the problematic views and behaviours of some of its volunteers and has started to be more selective when it comes to who is volunteering.

Unsurprisingly, there are many volunteers from the Kurdish diaspora but beyond this the majority of volunteers I’ve met or heard about here are leftists. There is a relatively large presence of Turkish comrades from Marxist-Leninist and Maoist organisations for example. The other volunteers here are mainly from Europe and north America, and the majority are in military units. This includes a dedicated international Tabur – the International Freedom Battalion – people at home have probably seen some of the great pictures from their English-speaking ‘Bob Crow Brigade’.

Due to language barriers, and the difficulties of travelling here and finding a placement where one can be useful, there aren’t that many international volunteers in civil society. Hopefully this will get easier as time goes on. At the moment if people want to volunteer here they should think about what skills they have or can get before they travel. For example, if people are interested then training up to be an ESL (English as a secondary language) teacher is a great way of being useful here as the demand for lessons is very high.

What do you think the presence of international volunteers adds to the movement?

Sometimes specific skills which are in high demand here, medical staff for instance. If not, at the very least volunteers work as a link between Rojava and the rest of the world. The people here know they aren’t alone and the rest of the world gets to find out a little more about what is happening. This is obviously a big responsibility for those with the ability to report back and portray an entire revolution based on their experiences. Those of us doing this need to try to be honest about what we’ve seen, what we think, and the limits of our personal experience.

It’s not surprising but it is disappointing to see criticisms of the majority of volunteers as ‘orientalist adventurers’, ‘closet islamophobes’, or ‘fantasists with a hero complex’ which have arisen in some parts of the left. Whilst a few people do fit this bill, most volunteers – especially politically active comrades who have responded to calls to volunteer – aren’t like this at all. The YPG is also now taking steps to filter those kinds of volunteers out. It’s quite astonishing how even what I’d call an uncontroversial historical value of the communist movement – internationalism – is coming under fire from those who also see themselves as part of the left. It feels like there are more left volunteers from pre-existing structures here now, or perhaps they are just using media channels more effectively. Either way, hammering home the point that this is a progressive struggle which is demanding the support of the international left and which sees itself as part of an international movement is massively important and is a political task we can all be involved with.

What do you think has been the most significant impact of the revolution so far?

For the people of the region the revolution has liberated them from the domination of the Assad regime and Isis. It has also made massive progress in terms of women’s liberation and direct democracy. Internationally the revolution has given a massive boost to the struggles north of the border in Bakur and Turkey and to revolutionaries further afield. Although we need to be cautious, there are many lessons we can learn from this revolution. At the very least Rojava serves as a reminder that revolution is always a possibility where revolutionaries are organised, committed and prepared to risk their lives.

Our two volunteers in Qamishlo

Any final comments?

The revolution here does not map onto the perfect fantasy of some revolutionaries in the west. It wasn’t the spontaneous uprising of the overwhelming majority of the people, they haven’t abolished the state (if that is ever possible) or capitalism, and there are still problems to be solved. Despite the fact that this isn’t full communism right here and right now, this revolution needs to be applauded and supported. Like all revolutions, this one has not emerged fully formed but is being built on the fly in the face of much opposition. Unlike many revolutions this one is quite hard to define: labels like ‘anarchist’ or ‘stateless revolution’ obscure more than they reveal. What we do know is that this revolution is pushing forward forms of popular democracy, women’s liberation and some form of solidarity economy. Life in Rojava is better for more people than most parts of the Middle East.

For those afraid of revolutionaries having real power to make change rather than maintaining ‘resistance’ forever, I’d like to quote Murray Bookchin (whose influence on the struggle here is definitely overstated in certain quarters).:

“Anarchists may call for the abolition of the state, but coercion of some kind will be necessary to prevent the bourgeois state from returning in full force with unbridled terror. For a libertarian organisation to eschew, out of misplaced fear of creating a ‘state’, taking power when it can do so with the support of the revolutionary masses is confusion at best and a total failure of nerve at worst.”

Those taking an ultra-left position on Rojava, and rejecting it out of hand, show us more about the weaknesses of their own politics than of the revolution taking place here. A real revolution is a mass of contradictions which must be fought through. That the revolution is doing that here without resorting to the dictatorship of one political party makes this a particularly important revolution for the libertarian left to be supporting.

There are more ways for the left to express solidarity with Rojava, and the wider struggle it is part of here in the region, than writing articles or sharing things on Facebook. Getting information out about what is happening here is important of course, but the obligations for political organisations who support the revolution here, and who have the capacity, must be much higher. For example in the UK Plan C’s Rojava solidarity cluster works with Kurdish-led structures organising discussions and demonstrations, has raised money for things like a school bus and medical supplies, and is now sending volunteers for civil work.

There are a few hardworking Kurdish solidarity groups in the UK also doing great work. When compared to long-running solidarity campaigns, like the Palestinian solidarity campaigns for instance, Kurdish solidarity campaigns are still in their infancy in the UK. The massive intensification of Turkey’s counterrevolutionary role both within its state borders and beyond, potentially spilling into Iraq this year, make this solidarity even more important. Effective national solidarity structures need to be established or joined, and federated together internationally. It’s a bit cliched but we can’t forget the slogan ‘solidarity isn’t a word, it’s a weapon’.

Peter Loo is a member of Plan C and is active in its Rojava solidarity cluster. His statement is here. His other most recent report can be read here.

* ‘Rojava’ is used instead of the Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria – the area’s official title – as both a shorthand and as the name many in the west are more familiar with.

Abdullah Öcalan on the return to social ecology

Abdullah Öcalan on the return to social ecology

“Humans gain in value when they understand that animals and plants are only entrusted to them. A social ‘consciousness’ that lacks ecological consciousness will inevitably corrupt and disintegrate”.

Just as the system has led the social crisis into chaos, so has the environment begun to send out S.O.S. signals in the form of life-threatening catastrophes. Cancer-like cities, polluted air, the perforated ozone layer, the rapidly accelerating extinction of animal and plant species, the destruction of forests, the pollution of water by waste, piling up mountains of rubbish and unnatural population growth have driven the environment into chaos and insurrection. It’s all about maximum profit, regardless of how many cities, people, factories, transportation, synthetic materials, polluted air and water our planet can handle. This negative development is not fate. It is the result of an unbalanced use of science and technology in the hands of power. It would be wrong to hold science and technology responsible for this process. Science and technology in themselves are not to blame. They function according to the forces of the social system. Just as they can destroy nature, they can heal it. The problem is exclusively a social one. There is a great contradiction between the level of science and technology and the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of people. This situation is the result of the interests of a minority that has control over science and technology. In a democratic and free society, however, science and technology will play an ecological role.

Ecology itself is also a science. It examines the relationship of society to its environment. Although it is still a very young science, it will play a leading role in overcoming the contradiction between society and nature together with all other sciences. The environmental consciousness that has already been developed in places will make a revolutionary leap forward through ecology understood in this way. The bond between the communal primitive society and nature is like the bond between child and mother. Nature is understood as something alive. The golden rule of the religion of this time was not to do anything against it in order not to be punished by it. The natural religion is the religion of the communal primitive society. There is no contradiction to nature, no anomaly in the emergence of society. Philosophy itself defines the human being as “nature becoming aware of itself”. The human being is basically the most developed part of nature. This proves the unnaturalness and anomaly of this social system, which puts the most developed part of nature in contradiction to it. The fact that this social system has turned the human, who enthusiastically united himself with nature in feasts, into such a plague for nature shows that it is itself the plague. The holistic nature of human and the natural environment does not only refer to economic and social issues. It is also an indispensable philosophical passion to understand nature. This is actually based on reciprocity. Nature proves its great curiosity and creative power by becoming human. The human being, on the other hand, recognizes itself by understanding nature. It is remarkable that the Sumerian word for freedom, “Amargi”, means return to the mother – nature. Between human being and nature there is a quasi love relationship. This is a great love story. To destroy this love is, religiously speaking, a mortal sin. Because you cannot create a greater sense of meaning than this one. In this context, the remarkable significance of our interpretation of the female bleeding is shown once again. It is both a sign of the distance from nature and of its origin. The woman’s naturalness stems from her closeness to nature. This is also the real meaning of her mysterious attraction.

No social system that is not in harmony with nature can claim rationality and morality for itself. Therefore, the system that is most at odds with nature will also be overcome in terms of rationality and morality. As can be seen from this brief definition of the contradiction between the capitalist social system and its present chaotic state and the catastrophic destruction of the environment, it is a dialectical relationship. The fundamental contradiction to nature can only be overcome by turning away from the system. It cannot be solved by environmental protection movements alone. On the other hand, an ecological society also requires a moral change. The amorality of capitalism can only be overcome by an ecological approach. The connection between morality and conscience demands an empathetic and sympathetic spirituality. This in turn only makes sense if it is based on ecological competence. Ecology means friendship with nature, belief in natural religion. In this respect ecology stands for a renewed, conscious and enlightened union into a natural, organic society.

Also the practical problems of an ecological way of life are quite topical. One of the tasks of the activists is to expand the many existing organizations in every respect and to make them an integral part of democratic society. This also includes solidarity with the feminist and liberal women’s movements. One of the most important activities in democratisation is the promotion and organisation of environmental awareness. Just as there once was a pronounced class or national consciousness, we must create an awareness of democracy and the environment through intensive campaigns. Whether we are talking about animal rights, the protection of forests or reforestation, such actions, if carried out properly, are indispensable elements of social actionism. For people who have no feeling for the biological can only have a disturbed social feeling.

Those who perceive the relationship between the two can feel true and with all their senses. Nature, which has so far been plundered and exposed, must and will witness a great struggle to restore its cover of flora and fauna. The forest will have to be given a chance again. “Great patriotism means reforestation and planting trees.” This is a valuable slogan.

Those who do not love and protect animals will also not be able to protect and love humans. Man gains value when he understands that animals and plants are only entrusted to him. A social “consciousness” that lacks ecological consciousness will inevitably corrupt and disintegrate, as was seen in real socialism. Ecological consciousness is a fundamental ideological consciousness. It resembles a bridge between philosophy and morality. A policy that promises salvation from the current crisis can only lead to a real social system if it is ecological. As with the problem of women’s freedom, the patriarchal and etatist understanding of power also contributes to the fact that ecological problems have been delayed for so long and have still not been solved properly. If ecology and feminism continue to develop, the patriarchal and etatist system becomes completely out of balance. The true struggle for democracy and socialism will only become a complete affair when it takes up the cause of women’s freedom and nature’s salvation. Only such a complete struggle for a new social system can lead to a meaningful way out of the current chaos.

The text is an excerpt from Abdullah Öcalan’s defense pamphlet “Bir Halkı Savunmak” (engl: “Beyond State, Power and Violence”.)

Rameau, Rondeau des Indes Galantes

PKK’s intervention in Shengal

PKK’s intervention in Shengal

The PKK intervention is in such a way that won’t allow for further massacres or genocides against the Yazidi people who have suffered 73 genocides.

• ANF
• NEWS DESK
• Saturday, 3 Aug 2019, 14:00

The whole world watched the Shengal genocide as if it was a movie. Unfortunately, nobody took action to stop this massacre. There was an absolute humanitarian tragedy. Yazidis (Êzidîs) experienced the greatest trauma of recent history. On the fifth anniversary of the Shengal massacre, there is still a need for this massacre to be analyzed in all aspects and brought to light still. Was the reason for the 73 genocides, the inhuman cruelty and genocide just that the Yazidis have a different faith? What other factors are at play? Who are attacking Yazidis, and why? Who has how much responsibility? These questions need to be asked and answered.

Siba Şêx Xidir and Til Zerê residential areas were attacked by explosive laden trucks on August 14, 2007 and there was a massacre. The perpetrators of this massacre and their motives still haven’t been brought to light. It shouldn’t be ignored that the attacks were based on political interests as much as a difference in faith. Like in August 2014 the KDP, responsible for defending Yazidis in the ISIS massacre, failed to carry out this duty and caused a social tragedy, they had a political responsibility in the massacre of August 2007. Not only a political responsibility, they had knowledge of and a role in the planning and execution of this massacre. It was revealed that the Turkish MİT was involved in this massacre. Shengal and thus Yazidis have been used as pawns for politics.

FOUNDATIONS FOR THE MASSACRE LAID IN 2007

A new constitution was drafted in post-Saddam Iraq in 2003. According to article 140 in this constitution, conflicted areas were to hold referendums to determine their status. The referendum planned for 2007 was to determine whether the line from Makhmur to Shengal, including Kirkuk, was to be under the Iraqi central government or the Kurdistan regional government. As Shengal was attacked with explosive laden trucks before the referendum, the vote could not be held and the fate of these conflicted areas was not clarified. Defining the August 2007 massacre without establishing its ties to the referendum would be obscuring the truth. A massacre scenario was devised and it was enacted by those whose plans for the referendum failed. The Yazidis were chosen as victims in this. KDP used this massacre as an excuse to fortify their own area of influence. Shengal was officially under the Mosul province, but in effect it came under control of the Kurdistan regional government. This in sum is the political play over the deaths of over 500 Yazidis. Who carried out the massacre is just a detail. If the massacres of Siba Şeyh Xidir and Tilezer are to be analyzed correctly, they should be considered in relation to the future of Shengal and the referendum.

The Yazidi genocide in Shengal in August 2014 is similar. The ISIS gangs attacking Mosul is the fruit of the same political tree. They wanted to balance symbolic Kurdish presidency, a symbolic Sunni parliament chair post and a strong and effective Shia Iraqi administration with ISIS. The Shia Iraqi government and Iran, gaining more and more influence, were to be restricted with ISIS against the growth of Shiaism in Iraq. It is the self-expression of the Sunni block through ISIS. The Turkish state, KDP and some Arab countries, and primarily the residue from Saddam, are the collective of accomplices.

SHENGAL WAS HANDED OVER, LIKE MOSUL WAS HANDED OVER TO ISIS

The gang group that assumed the name the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham targets mostly different faith groups and Kurds. Breaking the PKK control in the lands ISIS targets and eliminating the Kurds influenced by the PKK would serve ISIS in gaining territory, would allow the Turkish state some comfort and would push the KDP forth as a model. It would also serve to break the influence of Shiaism in Iraq. This is the politics of interest that birthed this monstrosity. ISIS attempted to advance by burning and destroying everything that crossed their path - until they were stopped in Kobanê. Shengal was handed over the same way that Mosul was handed over to ISIS. Those who tied their hopes to ISIS’s advance allowed them to advance quickly. That was why Shengal was left undefended. The Yazidi society was stuck victimized by political interests once more. A force making these dirty plans over Shengal and the Yazidi people claiming to be the conqueror of Shengal and claiming rights is such a sad contradiction.

PKK WAS THE ONLY FORCE

The states of the world were silently watching the Yazidi genocide in Shengal, and the PKK was the only force that intervened with the massacre with their own limited resources. Despite KDP’s obstacles and arrests against the intervening force, they stood against the ISIS attacks and prevented the massacre from achieving the ultimate result. PKK forces defended the Yazidi lands at the price of their lives. They opened a corridor for the people in the throes of hunger and thirst, desperate in the scorching desert sun, and removed the Yazidis from the area. The first intervention was an urgent intervention. It was done to save the people from the jaws of the beast, so to speak.

Analyzing the PKK’s intervention in Shengal as just stopping the Yazidi massacre, aiding the Yazidis, defending the Yazidi lands and transporting the Yazidis through a corridor would be lacking and insufficient. The PKK has made an intervention that goes beyond all these.

The PKK’s intervention in Shengal should be analyzed correctly. The PKK intervention is in such a way that won’t allow for further massacres or genocides against the Yazidi people who have suffered 73 genocides. The PKK’s intervention is in such a way that won’t allow for Shengal and the Yazidis to be sacrificed for political interests ever again.

The time to take advantage of the closed nature of the Yazidi society, the way they have been left out of politics and without self-defense, their financial struggles, the insecurity created by the small size of the population and using the Yazidis as pawns is over. Yazidis have evolved into a structure that will allow them to defend themselves and protect themselves against any attacks instead of the Yazidi people being used in wars as soldiers or peshmerga according to others’ interests. The youth, the women have organized themselves and have launched intense efforts to get to a point where they can answer the needs of the Yazidi society. Yazidis have become a society that learned to stand on their own without any outside help. It is an important achievement that they are handling political, military and diplomatic efforts over the Yazidi people’s organizations. What is happening in Shengal is a women’s revolution. The self-defense force YBŞ organizing the military structure and the security forces is no small feat.

SHENGAL SHOULD BE AUTONOMOUS

The Yazidis are developing their self-government. The assembly efforts have created a significant experience. They need to be more institutionalized, assumed as the governing model and go into action. Whether Shengal is under the Iraqi central government or the Kurdistan regional government, in any case, it needs to have an autonomous status. Considering the facts that the threat against Shengal is not completely removed and that it was a conflicted area and part of the Article 140, there is still a long way to go. But despite everything, the Yazidis are going through a process where they learn by doing, and do by learning. The fortune and the history of the Yazidis have changed.

DIRTY TRICKS

The PKK’s intervention in Shengal is geared towards building a new social system. It aims to create a free and political society. Most recently, a mixed group of gangs have resorted to military force and attacked Khanasor with Roj Peshmergas and counter units on March 3, 2017. They have murdered some ten of our friends and wounded others. They opened fire targeting women. Two female friends fell martyr while dozens of others were wounded. Failing to achieve results via provocative attempts on Shengal, KDP has resorted to dirtier tricks and are trying to pressure and intimidate the people. They want to achieve results via intimidation, arrests and buying people out. If that wasn’t enough, the Shengal mountain was also targeted by the Turkish state’s aerial attacks.

All of the Yazidi massacres were carried out during the Ottoman period. The Yazidis who fled Ottoman genocides and sought refuge in the Shengal mountain back in the day are now threatened by aerial attacks, to finish off the survivors of the ISIS massacres.

The partnership between the KDP and the Turkish state over Shengal has been exposed once more with these attacks. This alliance over animosity and murder of Yazidis is also a tacit alliance with ISIS. PKK’s intervention in Shengal is a permanent response to animosity against the Yazidi people.

Αιώνια η ντροπή των χυδαίων εχθρών τού ηρωϊκού ΡΚΚ: το ΡΚΚ έσωσε και οργάνωσε τον λαό των Γεζίντι απέναντι στους θεοκράτες φασίστες.

Επειδή υπήρξαν και υπάρχουν και στην επικράτεια τής Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας ορκισμένοι πολιτικοί και ιδεολογικοί εχθροί τού ηρωϊκού ΡΚΚ, θα τους καλούσαμε αν μπορούσαν να διαβάσουν να μελετήσουν και να μάθουν για τον σωτήριο ρόλο τού ΡΚΚ στην διάσωση και οργάνωση των Γεζίντι απέναντι στους Γενοκτόνους φασίστες τού ISIS, στο άρθρο που αναδημοσιεύσαμε [Αυτοκαθορισμός : Remembering the Şengal genocide].

Έπειτα, αφού σκύψουν το κεφάλι τους και αναλογιστούν τι έχουν πει με το λερωμένο ιδεοληπτικό στόμα τους, ειδικά οι "αυτόνομοι" και οι πολύ "αριστεροί" τού κΚε και των ελληνικών μ-λ, να μάθουν να σέβονται και να μη το "ανοίγουν" χωρίς να ξέρουν και χωρίς να θέλουν να μάθουν την αλήθεια που είναι μια και με την οποία δεν έχουν ούτε θα έχουν ποτέ σχέση.

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

Remembering the Şengal genocide

Πηγή:

On the path of truth with dynamism of the youth - Nûçe Ciwan

NEWS DESK – When on the 3rd of August 2014 the savage ISIS gangs swept over Şengal, which counted at that moment of the attack a population of 500 000 people due to migration, the Yazidi community witnessed with their own eyes how the Peshmerga of the KDP as well as the soldiers of the Iraqi army all ran away taking their entire weapons and armaments with them, throwing the Yazidi population under the bus and leaving them totally unprotected in the fangs of ferocious ISIS. The ISIS gangs launched their first attacks together with some local thugs that lived in southern Şengal, on the village Gir Zerik. Afterwards they aimed at the villages Siba Şêx Xidir, Rambosî, Til Qeseb, Kocho and Til Benadê.

THE PEOPLE FLED TO THE MOUNTAIN

The defenceless Yazidis who were left alone to fend for themselves, struggled with a couple of arms, which they successfully hid from the KDP. But it was impossible to stand against all the panzers, missiles and heavy artillery which the gangs had obtained from Mosul. The flight of the Peshmerga rendered the Yazidis completely desolate and dispirited, and therefore they headed to Mount Şengal, the last resort. Hundreds of thousands of Yazidis at all ages were at the mercy of a calamity and betook themselves desperately to the mountain. The Peshmerga of the KDP were meanwhile crossing the humanitarian corridor, which the YPG had opened, to Rojava and rushed from there over back to South Kurdistan.

“WE WITNESSED TREASON WITH OUR OWN EYES”

One of the fighters of the Şengal Defense Units (YBŞ) Tîrêj Şengalî conversed with the ANF on those very moments and said: “When ISIS got control of Mosul, up to 12000 soldiers that were stationed here assured us: ‘Şengal is our honour, we will defend it no matter what.’ But they did not fulfil that promise. They delivered us to the gangs and left us in the clutches of the genocide. We saw with our very own eyes how they abandoned these poor women and children and ran off. They betrayed this people. We have witnessed this treason by ourselves.”

“THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT STARS WERE SHINING”

One of the fighters of the Women’s Defense Units (YJŞ) Viyan Helabî called the incidents of the 3rd August 2014 in Şengal a Black Day and stated: “No matter how much and long we talk, we will never be able to put into words what really happened there back then. It was a black day. The whole world was watching minute for minute what barbarity was being done to the Yazidis. Everything, every step happened in front of the eyes of the tacit world. Those who fell into the hands of ISIS, were gone for good. They were either enslaved or slaughtered. But also among those who fled in masses to the mountain, countless died of thirst and hunger, whereas others fell from the crags and died. Some people also jumped from the high cliffs to save themselves from falling into the clutches of ISIS. Despite all that horror, on that night the stars over Şengal were sparkling brightly. It was a lucid night. Every moment was illuminated by the light of the stars. The stars were shining in an unnatural way. There was a meaning hidden behind that…

THE LIGHT OF HOPE IN MOUNT ŞENGAL

The ISIS gangs massacred only within the first 24 hours thousands of Yazidis and kidnapped tens of thousands. Those who managed to get to Mount Şengal beheld on the mountain a light of hope. The Yazidis who always fell victims to genocides in the course of history, looked now on a small group of guerrillas of the HPG standing there in front of them on Mount Şengal, having taken control of both routes and repelled the attacks of the ISIS gangs successfully. The guerrillas of the HPG had taken both routes leading to the mountain under their control with only some light personal arms and one DsHK, which the Peshmerga left behind as they were busy running away. The interview of the journalist Hayri Kızıler, who also left for the mountain as the genocide was taking place, gave us some impression of how the guerrillas used those personal rifles in the fight against the ISIS gangs.

AND HOPE GROWS

In his interview Kızıler gave following account: “The people arrived at the mountain, and by then the HPG had taken control of the routes. This was heart relieving, no matter how small. After that a vast unit of YPG fighters came in and they fought a fierce war of position, until they managed to get to the Mount Şengal. The next day, following the statement of the People’s Defense Central Headquarters Commander Murat Karayilan, a unit of guerrillas fought its way open to mount Şengal step by step. On the 5th August a local militia force was founded, called the Şengal Resistance Units. Emplacements were set and on the fifth day the mountain was secured completely. The HPG unit consisting of 7 guerrillas turned within shortest time into a 2 000 men and women strong force. On seeing this, the people gained new trust. With the arrival of the YPG and the HPG, the Yazidi people were filled with tremendous esperance.”

THE HUMANITARIAN CORRIDOR OF THE YPG AND YPJ

As news about the genocide were spread, Rojava mobilized to highest degree. The forces of the YPG and YPJ, who were themselves in Rojava’s Hesekê in the heat of a great operation against ISIS gangs and their appendages, left that operation halfway and moved heaven and earth to get to Şengal over the Til Koçer, Rabia and Jazaa route. The fighters of the YPG and YPJ opened a way of hundreds of kilometres, giving dozens of martyrs, and reached Mount Şengal finally on the 8th August. The fighters of the YPG and YPJ on the mountain guided hundreds of thousands of Yazidis with the cars of the mobilized inhabitants of Rojava placed at their disposal through the corridor to Rojava. The global community, which remained until then completely silent in view of the tragedy the Yazidi people faced, titled this corridor that has been fought open fiercely, the “humanitarian corridor”.

“WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO”

One of the commanders of the Şengal Defense Units (YBŞ) Tîrêj Şengal, who himself was among the civilians saving themselves through the “humanitarian corridor” to Rojava and decided to return once again to Mount Şengal, told ANF about his psychological state back then and the happenings he witnessed with these words: “We were really completely at a loss. Then we heard that some of the HPG guerrillas who were stationed on the mountain had entered the city and wanted to organise the people. Some of them were even arrested by the KDP. At that time we had crossed the border to Rojava, but many of us had the deep desire to return to Mount Şengal and do something, no matter what.”

12 RIDERS OF LEGENDARY DERWÊSHÊ EVDÎ

People’s Defense Central Headquarters Commander Murat Karayılan stated in an interview he gave in November 2014, that basing on the warnings of Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan they wanted to send their forces to Şengal, Makhmur and Kirkuk and to get on that issue into contact with the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).

Karayilan conversed on the diplomacy that were conducted then as follows: “The KDP asserted that they have got everything under control, that the Peshmerga units would be totally sufficient and that there would be no need for the guerrillas”. The PUK also said the same thing and added that in case they needed help they would call for us. We, the PKK, are taking matters into our own hands. And based on this we made some preparations. We mobilized 12 of our guerrillas to head to Şengal. When I talked with those 12 comrades, I compared them with the 12 riders of Derwêshê Evdî, a very famous Kurdish epic, and told them that they will defend Şengal the same way. We sent those comrades clandestinely to Şengal. When the Peshmerga got wind of that, they arrested three of our comrades of that group. The nine remaining guerrillas made their way carefully to their destination. On the 3rd August at 09:00 o’clock we received news of a catastrophic dimension and we heard that the Peshmerga had retreated from Şengal one day before. It was the first time for eight years that I used a phone to talk with the comrades in Şengal, and that minute we send off a unit of guerrillas to Şengal.”

“IN EVERY VALLEY AND CANYON WERE CORPSES”

From here on we leave the talking to the HPG guerrilla Êrîş Hewreman, who was one of the guerrillas of the “intervention force”: “We were put in charge as soon as the genocide in Şengal took place in order to rescue our people there. After we set off from Qandil, we crossed the border to Rojava and from then headed over the corridor, which the YPG had secured, to Şengal. As we betook ourselves to Şengal, we came across on the way many of our Yazidi people that had starved to death and severely effete children and elderly. A drop of water was a great need. The valleys and canyons were filled with corpses of those who were massacred by the ISIS gangs or died of thirst. What infuriated us even more than the actual abhorrent genocide, was the treason of the KDP, that bragged to be a Kurdish party”.

YAZIDIS SCATTERED ALL AROUND

The majority of the Yazidis managed to escape the genocide and reached Mount Şengal and were then taken to Rojava. Another part went to the cities of Southern Kurdistan. Those who reached Rojava were accommodated in the Newroz refugee camp in the Dêrik city. The Yazidi Kurds that crossed the border to Northern Kurdistan were placed into refugee camps mostly in the cities of Şırnak, Mardin, Batman and Amed. Some others headed afterwards, despite all calls of the Yazidi institutions and the Kurdish people, to Europe.

“YAZIDIS GOT TO KNOW THE PKK”

We want to listen once more to the words of the HPG guerrilla Êrîş Hewreman telling of what exactly was done back then and what kind of resistance was offered: “When the fighters arrived at the area and the Yazidi youth started to self-organize, the people was loaded up with great morale. Even though the corridor between Rojava and Şengal was closed again after some time, the morale did not fade at all. Between the people and the fighters a strong bond was forged. At the very beginning the Yazidi people did not know anything about the PKK at all. But now they have come to understand the PKK thoroughly. At that time they switched from the defense to offense, inflicting heavy blows to the enemy. Within a small area they offered a massive resistance 11 months in a row. It was an unparalleled resistance. The Yazidi community came to know and love heroes like Pirdoğan, Canfeda and Berxwedan.”

JOINT COMMAND FOR OFFENSIVE

On the one side a substantial struggle was waged in Şengal against the ISIS gangs, and on the other side the KDP put all its efforts into hindering the liberation of Şengal. On 29 October 2015 the Şengal Defense Units (YBŞ), the Women’s Defense Units (YJŞ) and the Şengal Defence Forces (HPŞ) issued a joint statement and declared the formation of a joint command for Şengal’s liberation, called the “Êzîdxan Command to liberate Şengal”.

COORDINATION BETWEEN YPJ/YPJ AND THE GUERRILLA

On the border to Rojava the forces of the YPG and YPJ liberated Hawl and Xatûniyê, providing a great boost to the operations to liberate Şengal. On the border to Şengal the guerrillas of the HPG and YJA-Star advanced on the mount Kolik and Geliyê Şîlo and liberated many villages of Şengal.

LIBERATION OF ÊZÎDXAN

The joint command that was forged on 29 October, heralded the start of the “Operation to Liberate Şengal” to the Yazidi community and the people of Kurdistan. After the operation was launched, the KDP mobilized on the eastern front to get rid of the bad reputation it had earned with its withdrawal from Şengal on 3 August. The Yazidi people who remained on Mount Şengal also took up arms in the framework of self-defence and joined the operation. Already on the second day of the operation the forces of the YBŞ and YJŞ and the guerrillas of the HPG and YJA-Star cleared the city centre of the gangs. The HPG command in Şengal as well as the general command of the YBŞ issued a statement saying: “We dedicate the liberated and free Şengal to our people.”

BARZANİ’S DENIAL EFFORTS

Şengal was freed from the ISIS gangs in front of the eyes of the entire closely watching world. The president of the KDP Masoud Barzanî however held a press conference one day after entering Şengal once more and tried to deny the reality that occurred second for second in front of the eyes of the world. He claimed that the Şengal town was secured by his Peshmergas. The fighters of the YBŞ and YJŞ and the guerrillas of the HPG and YJA-Star immediately went on liberating the villages in the south, as soon as they cleared the city centre. But the KDP Peshmerga took their seats in Şengal town centre, settled there and did not move an inch whatsoever.

Road to Shingal (Yazidi genocide documentary by Seth Frantzman)

Documentary film - Sinjar, december 2014

Το ερωτικό μήνυμα ενός φίλου..

"...Αγαπητέ Γιάννη, για την πρώτη και δεύτερη ουσία στον Αριστοτέλη στα έργα του: α) Κατηγορίαι 2a, 2b. β) Μετά τα Φυσικά Ζ3...''

 

Pasolini After Dante

Pier Paolo Pasolini Speaks

Canto Dei Sanfedisti

Σοσιαλιστική δημοκρατία και έριδα..

Υπάρχουν διάφορες προσπάθειες για την καταγωγική θεμελίωση τής έννοιας τής δημοκρατίας, και δεν προτίθεμαι βέβαια να τις παραθέσω τώρα, αλλά μπορώ να σας δώσω ένα μεζεδάκι για το πως θεωρώ εγώ ότι μπορεί να οριστεί μια νέα σοσιαλιστική μορφή της χωρίς να δεσμεύεται απόλυτα από την οποιαδήποτε καταγωγική θεμελίωση:

Βασικό στοιχείο των ανταγωνιστικών ταξικών κοινωνιών είναι η έριδα και η αγεφύρωτη σύγκρουση μεταξύ ατόμων, κοινωνικών τάξεων και μεταξύ άλλων κοινωνικών ή "ιδεολογικών" ομάδων.

Δεν θεωρώ ότι στον σοσιαλισμό που επιθυμώ θα εκλείψουν οι σκληρές αντιθέσεις, άρα και οι αντιπαραθέσεις μεταξύ ατόμων και κοινωνικών ομάδων, αν και οφείλω να "ξεκαθαρίσω" ότι για μένα δεν νοείται σοσιαλισμός χωρίς να υπάρχει δια αυτού κατάργηση των σχέσεων οικονομικής εκμετάλλευσης και καταπίεσης, χωρίς δηλαδή να υπάρξει κατάργηση τής ύπαρξης μιας ξεχωριστής τάξης ιδιοκτητών των [βασικών] μέσων παραγωγής και των πόρων.

Θα υπάρχουν άλλοι λόγοι σύγκρουσης και αντιπαράθεσης, θα υπάρχουν διαφορετικές γνώμες, διαφορετικές στρατηγικές για την πολιτική, οικονομική ίσως και πολιτισμική "υφή" του σοσιαλισμού.

Δεν θεωρώ ότι αυτοί οι ανταγωνισμοί θα είναι ήπιοι, όπως επίσης δεν θεωρώ ότι υπάρχει κάποια οντολογική διασφάλιση ότι οι συγκρούσεις που θα προκύπτουν από τις αντίθετες στάσεις και γνώμες θα είναι εύκολα αφομοιώσιμες σε ένα εκ των προτέρων διασφαλισμένο ως μη-ανταγωνιστικό κοινωνικό συνεχές.

Απλά το κοινό υπόβαθρο των συγκρούσεων θα είναι διαφορετικό από το κοινό υπόβαθρο στο οποίο έχουμε συνηθίσει να ζούμε ζώντας σε μια ταξική καταπιεστική κοινωνία όπου μια οικονομική ολιγαρχία "κανονίζει" την κοινωνική κανονικότητα σύμφωνα με τα οικεία ιδιοτελή συμφέροντα της και όπου τα υπόλοιπα "μέλη" τής κοινωνίας είναι "αναγκασμένα" να αγωνίζονται συνέχεια, υπό ανταγωνιστικούς όρους, για την ίδια την επιβίωση και αυτοσυντήρηση τους.

Η δημοκρατική απάλειψη των καταπιεστικών εκμεταλλευτικών όρων τής κοινωνικής παραγωγής, εν συντομία η υπέρβαση τού καπιταλιστικού αλλά και του κρατικιστικού τρόπου παραγωγής, θεωρώ όμως ότι θα φέρει ένα είδος δημοκρατικής ειρήνευσης, χωρίς να σημαίνει κατάργηση κάθε είδους ανταγωνισμού και σύγκρουσης.

Οι ποικίλες διατομικές και κοινωνικές συγκρούσεις θα συνεχίζονται σε ένα άλλο πλαίσιο, αλλά νομίζω ότι εντός τής σοσιαλιστικής δημοκρατίας θα εκλείψει η ακρότητα αυτών των συγκρούσεων, η αβυσσαλέα έκρηξή τους όπως λόγου χάριν παράγεται αναπόφευκτα από το ακραίο υλικό πλαίσιο ζωής των εργαζόμενων πολιτών μιας σύγχρονης καπιταλιστικής δημοκρατίας.

Η εικόνα ενός τέτοιου είδους σοσιαλιστικού δημοκρατισμού μάς ωθεί ή πρέπει να μας ωθήσει να αναθεωρήσουμε την μορφή και το περιεχόμενο τού μέχρι τώρα επαναστατισμού ή δημοκρατισμού μας, σε σχέση μάλιστα με όσα είπαμε στην αρχή.

Οι δημοκρατίες των ταξικών κοινωνιών [όταν υπήρξανε ή όπως υπάρχουν] δεν παύουν να είναι δημοκρατίες, δεν θεωρώ άρα ότι υπάρχει μια εντελώς "μη καταγωγική" θεμελίωση των σοσιαλιστικών δημοκρατικών προτύπων μας, αλλά ταυτόχρονα η δημοκρατία που θέλουμε να υπάρξει ως εργατική δημοκρατία πρέπει να κομίζει ένα νέο ιδιαίτερο στοιχείο που αφορά σε αυτήν την νέα μη-εριστική ή μη-απόλυτα εριστική και μη-δικηγορίστικη έκφραση και ουσία της.

Μέχρι τώρα ο δημοκρατισμός των εργαζόμενων πολιτών πιθήκιζε τον δημοκρατικό Λόγο των ρητόρων-δικηγόρων των ταξικών και ενδοταξικών συγκρούσεων των ταξικών δημοκρατιών, όπως διαμορφώνονταν και διαμορφώνεται [ως Λόγος] μέσα σε ένα πραγματικό ή φαντασιακό πεδίο μιας πραγματικής ή φαντασιακής ιστορικής δίκης. 

Η έριδα και η εριστικότητα παρουσιάζονταν ως ο μοναδικός τρόπος τής δημοκρατικής σοφιστικής. 

Τίποτα από όλα αυτά δεν πρόκειται να εκλείψει, οι αντιθέσεις και οι συγκρούσεις δεν θα λείψουν, αλλά υπάρχει ωστόσο ανάγκη να ανακαλύψουμε [πέραν των αστικών ή μικροαστικών "ευγενειών"] την ευγένεια τού σοσιαλιστικού ήθους, όπως τούτο θα προκύπτει [και] από τις συνεργατικές και συντροφικές σοσιαλιστικές παραγωγικές σχέσεις.

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

 

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya on the Kurdish National Question

Πηγή: dazibao rojo

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya on the Kurdish National Question

The following text is excerpted from a lengthy polemic by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya entitled The National Question in Turkey. This work was originally completed in December 1971, before Ibrahim Kaypakkaya led the genuine Marxist-Leninists in splitting with the Shafak revisionists, who were also billing themselves then as the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (TIIKP), and founded the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) in April 1972. The National Question in Turkey was re-edited by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya in June 1972, soon after the organisational split with the TIIKP revisionists.

The excerpts printed here are translated from a collection entitled Selected Writings, Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, which was published by Ocak Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1979. AWTW

2. Who is subjected to national oppression?

According to the Shafak revisionists, it is the Kurdish people who are being subjected to national oppression. This fails to grasp what national oppression means. National oppression is the oppression to which the ruling classes of the dominant nation subject the oppressed, dependent and minority nations. In Turkey, national oppression is the oppression by the ruling classes of the dominant Turkish nation not just of the Kurdish people but of the entire Kurdish nation, and not even of the Kurdish nation alone, but of all minority nationalities.

Who is Ibrahim Kaypakkaya?

Πηγή:

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya – Selected Works

Who is Ibrahim Kaypakkaya?

İbrahim Kaypakkaya (1949 – May 18, 1973) was a major leader of the Communist movement in Turkey. He was the founder of the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML).

 

Following the military memorandum of 1971, the Turkish government cracked down on the Communist movement in Turkey and was successful in destroying the machinery of the TKP/ML. Kaypakkaya and several of his colleagues were arrested. Kaypakkaya died in prison in 1973 after being tortured for over 4 months and later being shot in the head by his interrogators.

He is revered by his admirers today as a symbol of resistance, who describe him as an aggregator of the ideas and traits of other major leaders and thinkers in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

How did the Iranian Revolution go so far off the rails? – People's World

Πηγή:

How did the Iranian Revolution go so far off the rails? – People's World

The Iranian Revolution was supported by millions of people from all walks of life. | Courtesy Tudeh Party of Iran

Even though it has to wage much of its struggle underground, the Tudeh Party of Iran, 40 years after the overthrow of the autocratic U.S.-installed Shah, continues the fight for a secular, democratic, and socialist Iran. The following is an exclusive interview with Mohammad Omidvar, a member of the political bureau of the Tudeh Party.

Since left and progressive forces, including labor unions, wage an underground struggle in Iran, special measures had to be taken to conduct this interview. The questions and the answers were transmitted to and from Iran by a People’s World source outside that country. The Tudeh Party chose People’s World as the venue for this important interview because it wanted to give people in our country, on the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, a better understanding of what is happening in Iran.

The movement that started out with great hope for the future of that country became, for many reasons, a failed revolution. This interview helps clarify for our readers the reasons for this failure and outlines the direction in which the progressive forces in Iran hope to lead their country now. Omidvar also explains why the Tudeh Party opposes current U.S. sanctions against Iran and why the Trump policy of regime change is so fiercely opposed by the country’s progressive forces.

– John Wojcik, editor-in-chief, People’s World

People’s World: Progressive forces around the world had assessed the February 1979 revolution in Iran as a broadly-supported, all-encompassing social revolution, one of the most exciting and popular uprisings of the 20th century. What were the key factors in the final years of the Shah’s rule that led to the revolution? Iran under the Shah was often represented in the Western media as a strong, modern, and even democratic country. Was this the case?

Mohammad Omidvar—The 1979 revolution in Iran was a national democratic revolution, a classic example of a majority- supported revolution that took place in the particular circumstances of the growth of capitalism in Iran. In the 1960s and ’70s, Iranian society faced a profound structural crisis due to the expansion of capitalist relations whereby representatives of the comprador bourgeois class dominated the political and economic life of the country.

The ever-increasing influence of capital in the Iranian economy, with a police state that prevailed to safeguard the despotic client regime, resulted in the middle strata becoming ever more squeezed. This also led to the weakening of the economic positions of sections of the national bourgeoisie. It is also noteworthy that during the same period the working class was experiencing a modest growth due to the migration of a large number of people from rural areas into cities as a result of the pseudo-land reforms enacted. The real reason for these limited reforms was to eliminate the threat to the Shah’s regime from large landowners.

This gave the growing working class more social weight within the class structure of our society. The 1979 Revolution, therefore, arose from serious socio-economic crises and class contradictions created by the dominating interests of comprador bourgeois and the despotic rule of a corrupt, pro-western regime. It mobilized millions of people—from workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie to sections of the small and medium national bourgeoisie—against the Shah’s regime.

The Iranian Revolution and the toppling of the Shah’s regime was supported by the vast majority of people; millions were in the streets calling for change. What were the key demands of the majority of these forces in the 1979 Revolution, and was the establishment of a theocratic state one of them?

As mentioned before, a wide range of social forces—from the working class to the national bourgeoisie, the middle strata, and the petty bourgeoisie, and the various socio-political forces representing their interests—participated in the revolution with different perspectives and programs. The people’s slogan was “Freedom, Independence, and Social Justice,” and that was the approach supported by our party. The religious forces insisted on adding the “Islamic Republic” to the people’s demands; they did not reveal, at first, what that would mean in practice. They revealed nothing of the characteristics of the kind of state they were planning.

How and why did the forces of what you describe as “political Islam” manage to gain the upper hand? Wasn’t it possible for other revolutionary and/or secular forces to prevent this?

People vs. Army – 1978. | Courtesy Tudeh Party of Iran

The ruling theocratic regime’s propaganda claims that the people of Iran came to the streets to topple the regime of the Shah in order to establish the “rule of Islam.” In reality, the 1979 Revolution had a clear social and class context that was aimed at removing the destructive influence of imperialist monopolies from our country, securing Iran’s economic and political independence, establishing justice, and democratizing the political and cultural life of our society.

The 1979 Revolution ended up being taken over by religious forces for a number of critical reasons, dating right back to the aftermath of the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup d’état in Iran, which re-established the Shah’s regime. Over the following 25 years, while the left forces—especially the Tudeh Party of Iran, the nationalist forces and, later on, the guerrilla movements, including the People’s Fedaian and People’s Mujahedin—were heavily suppressed by the security forces, the clergy were allowed to use their networks, mosques, and religious events to organize and promote their agenda (Political Islam).

The Shah’s regime and its dreaded security force, SAVAK, saw the clergy as an important tool in countering the left and radical forces in Iran. Indeed, in letters exchanged between then-President Carter and Ayatollah Khomeini (now published in the mémoires of Dr. Yazdi, Khomeini’s close confidante in Paris and Iran’s first post-revolutionary foreign minister), the U.S. was prepared to tolerate Khomeini’s regime provided they guaranteed to stop the influence of the Tudeh Party of Iran in Iran’s post-revolution era.

In your publications, your assessment is that, after its initial success in overthrowing the Shah’s regime and bringing about a number of political changes, the 1979 Revolution was halted and ultimately failed. What characterizes it as a failed revolution, and was this inevitable? Could other revolutionary forces, including the Tudeh Party, have done things differently, thereby altering the negative course the revolution was taking? Did the left, including the Tudeh Party, make any mistakes, in your estimation?

Ehsan Tabari, one of the key leaders of the Tudeh Party of Iran, addresses a rally in    Tehran articulating the position of the Party on the drafting of the new constitution, November 1979. | Courtesy Tudeh Party of Iran

The Iranian Revolution successfully completed its political phase of overthrowing the Shah’s despotic regime. It was clear to our party that for the revolution to succeed, it needed to evolve into its social phase, replacing the socio-economic order it had inherited from the Shah’s regime with a new order.

Many of our party’s slogans and our platform—including the nationalization of banks and multinational companies, as well as land reform—was carried out in the atmosphere that existed in the first year of the revolution. However, constant U.S. and reactionary interference in Iran, including the imposition of the imperialist-instigated Iraq-Iran War, stopped the revolution in its tracks and provided the backdrop for Khomeini and his followers to stop these programs and move towards the establishment of a theocratic regime.

At the time, conscious of challenges facing the revolution, our party called for the formation of a “people’s united front” with other revolutionary forces to make sure that the revolutionary movement would not be derailed, but this did not materialize due to significant political differences among those forces.

Our party, in its analysis of the early years of revolution, concluded that in our policy of “critical unity” with Khomeini and his followers, we were perhaps more concerned with unity than being critical of some of the policies that clearly were not in line with revolutionary ideals and the people’s demands. It is clear that had the left-democratic forces managed to come together, it would have been possible to change the balance of forces politically in the country for a different outcome. The reactionary forces, in a matter of three years, were able to attack the left and democratic forces one-by-one and then establish their absolute rule in Iran.

The major slogans of the 1979 Revolution were for freedom, independence, and the establishment of a republic, with democratic rights and structures, to replace the Shah’s dictatorship. What is the Tudeh Party’s assessment of the outcome of the revolution for democracy, gender equality, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and trade union rights in Iran?

Iran, 40 years after the revolution, is ruled by a despotic regime with no regard for human and democratic rights. Over past decades, we have witnessed laws restricting women’s rights and their treatment as second-class citizens. This has included medieval laws permitting the marriage of girls as young as 11, as well as enforcing gender segregation in places of education and even hospitals.

The regime has also ruthlessly suppressed the basic rights of ethnic and national minorities, as well as religious minorities. Its record on trade union rights remains appalling. Many trade unionists are imprisoned or exiled and trade union activity either restricted by the state or forced underground. The regime has never accepted the legal operation of trade unions. It only permits Islamic Labor Councils—tripartite bodies involving the employers, government representatives, and employees—thus breaching ILO Conventions 87 and 98, guaranteeing all workers the right to belong to a trade union of their choice and engage in trade union activities.

During the past forty years, many significant social movements have demanded, and continue to demand, change in Iran. Have these movements aimed to reform the political and socio-economic system in Iran, or have they been directed towards a more fundamental change in the social order?

Protest in the industrial city of Arak – workers of HEPPCO and Azarab, two major manufacturers, protesting against privatization, unpaid salaries, and unacceptable conditions of service. | Courtesy Tudeh Party of Iran

Over the past two decades, powerful social movements have emerged in Iran demanding change in the way the country is ruled and rebelling against corruption and repression. In 1997, Mohammad Khatami became Iran’s president promising reform and the “rule of law.” There was a powerful social force, from women to youth and students, behind Khatami, and he received over 20 million votes in the election.

But his government’s promises were not realized due to their overriding belief that change could only take place if permitted by the “Supreme Religious Leader” and could not cross the “red lines” of the Islamic Republic. Over the eight years of Khatami’s presidency, despite some respite in terms of the oppression, real changes to Iran’s power structure never materialized, and the regime was able to neutralize the social movements and gain the initiative against them.

Socio-economic conditions continue to worsen in Iran. Poverty is at unprecedented levels, with some estimating 40 percent of the population being below the poverty line, all while the regime has sold over $800 billion worth of oil over the last three decades. Now we are witnessing a radicalization of people’s demands amidst growing workers’ strikes and protests. In late 2017 and into 2018, we had sporadic protests in 80 Iranian cities which the regime suppressed savagely. And over the past three months, we have been witnessing prolonged workers’ strikes in key industries such as steel, automobile, and sugarcane in the south of Iran. People are demanding an end to the current neoliberal policies of privatization, economic hardship, and the unprecedented levels of corruption.

One of the characteristics of the 1979 Revolution was its then-stated “anti-imperialist” position. Some of the acts of the theocratic leadership were seen by some on the left as having a progressive motivation, as Iran’s way of protecting its sovereignty. How does the Tudeh Party assess the theocratic leadership’s stated policy of being opposed to U.S. imperialism? Is it sincere? Has the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran benefitted the Iranian people in any way?

It is true that one of the key characteristics of our revolution was its anti-imperialism, and especially in opposition to U.S. imperialism, due to their long-term interference in our country and plundering of our national resources, including oil and gas. The religious leaders used these slogans, which were mainly viewed as Tudeh Party slogans, to consolidate their position in the revolutionary movement

Clearly, their anti-American slogans were not based on the same understanding as the anti-imperialist slogans of the left and our party, which reflected our view of the destructive role of monopoly capital on the world stage and our belief that anti-imperialist forces should unite and work together to build a different world. The Iranian regime’s ideal economic model was that of a capitalist order wrapped up with empty Islamist slogans.

For the Iranian regime, its influence in the region and the building of an Islamic empire was a critical part of its foreign policy and, as such, clashed with that of reactionary and puppet regimes in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Persian Gulf region. It is also important to note that at the most critical points in our region’s recent history, including the imperialist aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iranian regime—according to its own leaders—helped U.S. plans by opening up the country’s airspace so that attacks could be carried out against both neighboring countries.

The Trump administration is now openly following a policy of regime change in Iran. What is your party’s position on the possibility of such an external intervention? Can you give us your opinion about the activities of President Trump, the Israeli government, Saudi Arabia, and their allies?

In a statement by our Central Committee on May 1, 2018, in response to the growing threat from the U.S. and its allies, our party opined that: “In analyzing the current developments in the Trump administration and the coordination—more than ever before—of the governments of Israel and Saudi Arabia with that administration, many of the world news agencies have commented that the risk of a military conflict between Israel and Iran is now higher than ever.”

We further elaborated that: “Our country and the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East is once again faced with a very serious and urgent threat of catastrophic military conflicts which will have dire consequences for Iran and the entire region. Ignoring these threats and supporting the destructive and interfering policies of the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, contrary to the claims of some of the foreign-allied, anti-people, so-called opposition not only will not lead to the liberation of Iran from the claws of the current theocratic regime but, like the imperialist-inflicted war of Iraq with Iran (1980-88), will have very damaging consequences for our nation, and for the popular movement for freedom, sovereignty, and social justice. The struggle of the Iranian people to dispose of the theocratic rule and establish a national and democratic regime in Iran…is not achievable through the destructive military intervention of such reactionary forces as the Trump, Netanyahu, and Bin Salman administrations. In such critical times, the most important task of all the national and democratic forces is to organize and mobilize all peace-seeking forces of the nation and the world to prevent another disastrous and destructive war in our region.”

What is the attitude of the Tudeh Party and the progressive and labor movement toward the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration against Iran? How do the sanctions hurt progressive forces?

Metalworkers protest the non-payment of their salaries. | Courtesy Tudeh Party of Iran

The Trump decision, in complete contravention of world public opinion, to take the U.S. out of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Agreement with Iran…has significantly increased tension in the region and raised the threat of a new devastating war in the Middle East.

We condemn the re-imposition of economic and banking/monetary sanctions on Iran, which constitute an illegal violation of an international agreement ratified by the UN Security Council and mostly hurt the ordinary people of Iran. It is worth mentioning that similar sanctions against Iraq, prior to the U.S.’ military attack on that country in 2003, cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of vulnerable citizens, including children and the elderly.

Despite Trump’s claim that his actions will help the Iranian people’s struggle, it is clear that U.S. policy is to change the course of the Iranian people’s struggle and facilitate a regime change to establish a puppet government.

The struggle of the Iranian people against the religious dictatorship in Iran can only be determined by the Iranian people and its progressive forces. The backing of John Bolton and the Trump administration for the Pahlavi family (the family of the deposed Shah of Iran) and the so-called “National Council of Resistance” headed by Maryam Rajavi—who for many years received the patronage and protection of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and who currently receives hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of support from the criminal Bin Salman government regime in Saudi Arabia—clearly shows the real intentions of the U.S. government towards Iran and our peoples’ struggle.

The Tudeh Party of Iran, along with other progressive forces in our country, view U.S. sanctions and its interference in Iran as directly opposed to the national interest of our country and our peoples’ struggle against the dictatorship in Iran.

What objectives is the Tudeh Party pursuing at this stage of the struggle for the transformation of your country?

Forty years after the victory of the 1979 Revolution, Iran is in need of fundamental and democratic change. The future of our country should be determined by our people, without external interference, through the establishment of a democratic political system.

Iran has remained at the stage of National Democratic Revolution and the Tudeh Party of Iran is committed to our country realizing the following objectives: safeguarding national sovereignty; rolling back and eliminating the neoliberal economic restructuring implemented by the Islamic Republic; limiting and directing the growth of capitalism towards the growth and development of the productive forces of our national economy; the fair redistribution of materials and wealth; and, the realization of democratic freedoms and social justice.

The Tudeh Party of Iran continues to believe that such a change requires the formation of a united anti-dictatorship front by mobilizing all social forces within our country and the emergence of a strong union of left and progressive forces with effective participation of the working class.

The Tudeh Party of Iran believes the most urgent goal of the progressive forces in Iran is that they work together to prepare the grounds for ending the absolute rule of the Supreme Religious Leader once and for all, in order to open the way for fundamental democratic and enduring change in our country.

Cavalier, تک سوار

1η Μάη 2019

1η Μάη 2019.

Η ιρανική εργατική τάξη βρίσκεται εδώ και δεκαετίες εγκλωβισμένη σε ένα αδιέξοδο δίλημμα:

Να διεκδικήσει ανυποχώρητα τα δικαιώματά της χωρίς να φοβάται το ενδεχόμενο μια εξέγερση της ενάντια στο θεοκρατικό καπιταλιστικό καθεστώς να χρησιμοποιηθεί-εργαλειοποιηθεί από τις δυτικές ιμπεριαλιστικές δυνάμεις και το αμιγώς πλέον ακροδεξιό Ισραήλ για να διαλύσουν και αποικιοποιήσουν δια της ψευτο-ομοσπονδιοποίησης την χώρα που ζει; με εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες θύματα και το έθνος κατεστραμμένο;

Ή να συνεχίσει να κάνει υπομονή και να δέχεται την ηγεμονία των θεοκρατών για να μην καταστραφεί η χώρα από τους λύκους που την περιτριγυρίζουν διψασμένοι για θάνατο και καταστροφή, με αποτέλεσμα όμως αυτής τής υπομονής την συνέχιση τής καταστολής της, και την ενδυνάμωση των αντιδραστικών αντιιμπεριαλιστών δολοφόνων;

Αυτό το δίλημμα είναι δικό της αλλά αν θεωρήσουμε ότι η εργατική τάξη του Ιράν, οι εργαζόμενοι της χώρας αυτής και τα φτωχά λαϊκά κοινωνικά στρώματα, είναι μέρος τής παγκόσμιας εργατικής τάξης, μέρος του παγκόσμιου λαού, τότε το δίλημμα είναι και δικό μας.

Πως θα απαντούσε ένα αυτόνομο δημοκρατικό ταξικό κίνημα σε μια άλλη χώρα στην αγωνία αυτών των ανθρώπων;

Πως θα απαντούσαν άραγε οι ξερόλες διανοούμενοι στην δύση και οι πολυάριθμες σεκταριστικές και ρεφορμιστικές αριστερές, κομμουνιστικές, αναρχικές ομάδες και οργανώσεις στην δύση και την Ελλάδα; πως θα απαντούσε άραγε το πρώην-κομμουνιστικό ΥπερΚόμμα ελλάδας; η Λαέ, οι Εξαρχειώτες;

Είμαι σίγουρος ότι όλοι αυτοί έχουν την απάντηση έτοιμη:
Η μια αντίθετη και συμπληρωματική προς την άλλη.

Τα συγχαρητήρια μου σε όλους.

Στις πορείες σας τώρα, άντε και καμιά μολότωφ να περνάει η ώρα..


Ζήτω η ιρανική εργατική τάξη και ο ηρωικός πολιτισμένος λαός τού Ιράν!

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

Πουθενά-Πουθενάς