There will be a revolution in Iran.

I stand unreservedly in solidarity with the liberal, democratic and leftist people of Iran, in their struggle for democracy, human rights and true socialism that will unite universal liberal and democratic values with the direct democracy of workers' councils.

 

The historical riddles of the Middle East, which are also world riddles, will be solved through the democratic labor movement in Iran.
As you have understood, I am not in favor some fundamental analyzes and positions of the Iranian left (and the left in general, ''today'') but I am not the right person to judge it, so I support its political victory despite my objections, and I wish the multi-ethnic Iranian people to become a global example for the revival of the social labor movement.

 

I want Iranians and Kurdish friends to know and remember that a lone voice in Greece always sings and always will sing the monotonous song:
"There will be a revolution in Iran"

 

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

 

 

 

 

Φιλοσοφικές σημειώσεις στην άκρη ενός απογεύματος.

Αν θεωρήσουμε την αντίθεση Κεφαλαίου Εργασίας ως οντολογική αντίθεση, τότε, όταν η εργασία ακολουθεί σαν πιστό σκυλί το Κεφάλαιο στην καταλήστευση και καταστροφή τής Φύσης είναι δυνατόν να κατανοηθεί (στα πλαίσια αυτού τού σχήματος) μόνον ως μη συνειδητή, έκπτωτη, αμαρτωλή υπόσταση που δεν ακολουθεί την εσωτερική υπόσταση της. 

Όμως, η εργασία δεν έχει μια τέτοιαν εσωτερική υπόσταση ως εσωτερικότερη τής υπάρχουσας. 

Η εσωτερικότητα που καταστρέφεται και διώκεται από το Κεφάλαιο και το κατά καιρούς εργασιακό/εργατικό παρακολούθημά του, είναι η Φύση.

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Η Φύση ως έννοια αμφισβητείται πλέον ριζικά από τις κοινωνικές και φιλοσοφικές επιστήμες, παρά τις οικολογικές και φιλοζωικές ευαισθησίες που γίνονται δεκτές στους κόλπους τους, υποκριτικά. 

Κι αν ακόμα διαβάσεις ριζοσπάστες αντι-σπισιστές κ.λπ θα δεις ότι αποφεύγουν τον όρο Φύση όπως ο γεροδιάολος το λιβάνι, ως φοβούμενοι (ίσως παραπάνω από αυτούς πού ακολουθούν τις ανθρωποκεντρικές γνωσιο-οντολογίες) να παραβιάσουν την Αρχή τής υπεροχής τής συμβολικής τάξης.

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Ο αποτυχημένος αναγωγισμός κατά την προσπάθεια να βρεις τις αιτίες όλων των συγκρούσεων και κάθε μίας ξεχωριστά, ανάγοντας τες όλες σε ένα ή το πολύ δύο δίπολα, είναι πάντα χειρότερος από έναν τίμιο φαινομεναλισμό που επιμένει να παραμένει στην ίδια την επιφάνεια των συγκρούσεων σαν να υπήρχαν όλες (άρα και κάθε μία ξεχωριστά ) δια της μοναδικής και αυτοτελούς ουσίας τους.

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Αν η ανθρώπινη γλώσσα πρέπει να αντιμετωπίζεται από τον ίδιο τον εαυτό της ως ένα κάλπικο νόμισμα το οποίο δια τής γλωσσοανάλυσης ακυρώνεται συνέχεια ως κάλπικο χωρίς όμως να αντικαθίσταται (έστω στιγμιαία) από ένα αυθεντικό νόμισμα, τότε η ουσία μιας αληθινής γλώσσας θα ήταν μια μη γλώσσα. 

Αντίφαση είναι όλο αυτό, αν δεν δοξάζει πάλι μια σιωπή.
Ή κάνω λάθος;

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Η αποκάλυψη τής εγγενούς ενδογλωσσικότητας τής σκέψης σημαίνει μια σχεδόν κατάργηση τού όρου σκέψη, εκτός αν ο ίδιος ο όρος τούτος συνοδεύεται πάντα από τον όρο γλώσσα, σε ένα διαρκές παιχνίδι ταύτισης/και/διάκρισης μέσα στην ταύτιση των δύο αυτών όρων: Σκέψη-γλώσσα σε έναν αέναο ορολογικό αλληλοαντικατοπτρισμό κ.λπ. 

Αυτή η αποκάλυψη όμως σημαίνει και την εγκατάσταση μιας μόνιμης ενοχής εντός τής γλώσσας καθαυτής. 

Η γλώσσα ή γλωσσικότητα καθίσταται ο όρος εκείνος που στέφει κάθε άλλον όρο που σχετίζεται νοηματικά ή ιδεολογικά με την σκέψη, αλλά με τίμημα την μεγαλύτερη ενοχή που υπήρξε ποτέ κατά την διάρκεια αυτοελέγχου μιας νοητικής-γλωσσικής διεργασίας. 

Ο Βασιλιάς αυτού τού νέου φιλοσοφικού και ιδεολογικού Βασιλείου, η γλωσσικότητα, βασιλεύει ως ένας απόλυτος ένοχος που ανακαλύπτει την ενοχή του σε όλη την έκταση τού Βασιλείου αυτού που «ήταν» πάντα ο «ίδιος», ως μοναδικός άρχων και ως μοναδικός πολίτης του, με αυτόν τον τρόπο καθιστάμενος (ο ίδιος) αποκαλυπτικός Κήρυκας τής αυτοαναίρεσης του τούτης ως σημείου τής κυριαρχίας του επί των πάντων που αφορούν στην σκέψη.

Η γλωσσικότητα ως ένας απόλυτος ηγεμόνας πλέον, ο οποίος αντλεί την σημερινή εξουσία του από την αποκάλυψη τής απόλυτης ενοχής του σε όλη την χρονική έκταση τού παρελθόντος, όπου ασκούσε την εξουσία του χωρίς αυστηρά τεθειμένα όρια, αλλά επίσης (αντλεί την σημερινή εξουσία του) και από την σημερινή λειτουργία του να αυτοελέγχεται διαρκώς ως προς την τάση του να θεωρεί τον εαυτό του ως κάτι παραπάνω από γλωσσική μορφή, ελέγχοντας έτσι όσους δεν έχουν ακόμα την δυνατότητα να πράξουν το ίδιο.

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Με βάση την προηγουμένη σημείωση: 

Δεν γνωρίζω κανένα θεωρητικό ιδεολογικό φιλοσοφικό σύστημα σκέψης ή γλωσσικότητας που να μην φορτώνει την πλάτη τής ανθρώπινης υπόστασης με ένα φρικτό βάρος ενοχής, και βέβαια σε αυτή την επαίσχυντη πράξη δεν βλέπω να απουσιάζουν πολλοί θορυβώδεις δήθεν εχθροί τής ενοχικότητας, Νίτσε Υπαρξιστές και άλλοι, νεώτεροι και με πολλά «μετα-» στην φαρέτρα τους. 

«Κατηγορώ τους πάντες», γιατί όσο περνάει ο καιρός νιώθω ότι μας έχουν πρήξει το συκώτι προτού ακόμα στείλουν το αρπακτικό πτηνό να το φάει.

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Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

 

 

 

West/East

I assume that the emergence of a new supranational imperialist pole-world after there has already been another that has already been formed, creates the historical need for this new pole-world to emerge in a different way. In this case, the new imperialist East could not emerge in the same way that the West emerged. Due to the primary historical dominance of the West, the East developed in 2 relatively distinct separate phases, while the West developed in a single framework of determinants: The West emerged as a self-contradictory unity that was composed from the beginning simultaneously of the ethno-political units and the supranational Western system of domination as a whole (all this through a continuous process of conflicts and massacres, and not as outlined in liberal historiographies). While the East (as the most powerful representative of the non-Western world) as an emerging imperialist pole-world is obliged to follow a process in two separate phases: first the nation-state emerged and then (now) an attempt is made to emerge the broader special supranational framework (in essence the imperialist new east as such).

But I want to point out something: the historical priority of the West did not make it superior, and also the singularity of the imperialist New East does not simply mean that it imitates the West and on the other hand develops a singularity that would enable it to walk the general path that the west has already carved. Both what precedes and what follows constitute, from their objective historical-chronological position, a singularity each, which, however, includes the same degree of generality. The two peculiarities of emergence constitute a single phenomenon as absolutely necessary unfoldings of its dialectical nature.

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Speaking of the new imperialist East, we make a series of horrible abstractions. What about India? what about  Indonesia? what about Japan? The relationship of these countries with the hard-line new eastern imperialists does not make them as countries members of an aggressive as a whole neo-East. Japan in particular seems to function as an advanced outpost of the West, is not a candidate to participate in a new anti-Western totalscheme. Also, in the south there is Latin America, which probably approaches the new East more than the aforementioned eastern countries. Well, the distinction between the West and the new aggressive East must be understood in a non-exclusively geographical geostrategic way.

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

The Jimi Hendrix Experience - Foxey Lady (Miami Pop 1968)

The Jimi Hendrix Experience - Voodoo Child (Slight Return)

A comment on Michael Karadjis' answer..

 

 

Following the:

Questions to Michael Karadjis.

Some general remarks, in relation to your kind reply,

Michael Karadjis 

1.

When we refer to territorial-centric capitalism-imperialism, perhaps we should not limit ourselves to "territorial visions" of annexations, etc., but to a plan to return to the Westphalian or pseudo-Westphalian nation-state whose main characteristic is the homogenous and hard-line dominance over a territorial space.

Newer Western capitalism played with the scenario of a complete de-territorialization of it, while the emerging nation-statist state-centric Eastern capitalism of the emerging great or would-be great new Eastern imperialisms play with the scenario of a new territorialization.

There are of course great contradictions between them, there is no strictly demarcated and unified block of these forces, but they have strong common elements that do not only concern ideological or imaginary identifications.

They are converging on a new and hybrid model of state-centric capitalism (with a strong but controlled private sector), which is authoritarian in a structural rather than a circumstantial way.

The west has all the bourgeois possibilities "within" it (bourgeois democracy, dictatorship-junta, hybrid combinations thereof, etc.), but the east, I think, is developing a structural and now stabilized neo-despotism.

The territorial-centric model therefore means a tendency to remove what Deleuze defined as de-territorialization (as it exists in capitalism but also in Deleuze's desire to appropriate "nomadism", and to constitute a radical anarcho-Marxism -and others, it's not time to analyze them). The extreme reinstatement of territorial-centrism through the bloody campaign of the Russians apart from all else wich it means in practice perhaps also symbolizes a re-emergence of the ''self-enclosed territoriality'' of the nation-state. China still has no territorial claims beyond Formosa (although I think Vietnam should start to worry) (don't forget it swallowed Tibet) but the whole essence of its state policy is incomprehensible without seeing how it views its territory. I think China is now a well-polished and domesticated open concentration camp promoting a new type of techno-totalitarianism/capitalism (extreme surveillance of citizens, etc.).

2.

There is certainly no ontologically or even worse culturally understood "eastern pole", but an idiosyncratic and original revival of the first stages of the emergence of the "western pole", when together with the emergence of the Westphalian nation-states emerged the non-national context of their emergence.

In the first phase the non-Western capitalist world (as yet another new capitalist world) tried to emerge mainly as nation-state, the original modern-capitalist "unit" of sovereignty, without the wider special context (as happens in the West, where through horrific intra-capitalist and transnational antagonisms this wider framework was constituted: "west"), and in the phase we are in today, the non-western capitalist world (mainly the "east": China-Russia-Turkey-Iran perhaps) has conceives and has begun to implement the plan to make this strong broader special framework which it could not implement in the original first phase (despite the Soviet state capitalist "nudges" and the Soviet plan to create an alternative non-Western capitalism in the new countries etc.).

This second phase of the new capitalism of the non-Western world, as it is "interwoven" with the strong statist tendencies of its first phase, presents us with the possibility that there is, historically necessary, an extreme violence from the perspective of the "new east'', as if we could speak of a process of primary accumulation of power in two phases.

In the West, or rather, the West was something that emerged as a broader context of the emergence of a new mode of production but also a new mode of structuring of power (in nation states that exist as "units of sovereignty" and in the broader and more fluid "unit of sovereignty'' which is the west as such as a world-imperial system), while the east is something that emerges similarly to the west, but with a need to accelerate, and in two phases.

3.

The idiosyncratic new authoritarianism of the emerging new east does not arise from any inherent "cultural" characteristics of it, but from the historical necessity that means the emergence of the non-west nation-states and a wider authoritarian form of their capitalism, under the special condition of a ''late realization'', which mandates the structural existence-and-coexistence of two phases in a state of acceleration of this process:

First phase-acceleration: nation-state without a wider "familiar" cosmo-imperial non-national framework.

Second phase-acceleration: emergence of the wider "familiar" cosmo-imperial non-national framework with a simultaneous defense-attack against the already formed ("west"), given the idiosyncratic crystallizations of the first phase (strong existence of a strict version of the nation-state determination).

 

 

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

 

 

Answers of Michael Karadjis.

 

Following the:

Questions to Michael Karadjis.

Michael Karadjis

Hi Ιωάννη

At the moment I’ll just respond to your first 3 questions – the Syria question is more major, and I also have a great deal more knowledge and conviction in relation to those important questions related to the whole course of the revolution, so I’ll leave that to a special response a little later. 

On the imperialism questions, I hardly claim to be an expert but am happy to offer my opinions:

1. 

Is the new imperialist world multipolar or (potentially) (again) bipolar?

I guess by bipolar you mean, is the Ukraine war pushing together US and European imperialism on one side and Russian and Chinese imperialism on the other side? Or do you simply mean, despite Ukraine, the real major imperialist rivals are only the US and China? Either way, I wouldn’t go so far, but I tend towards the second interpretation. 

I think there is serious inter-imperialist rivalry between the US and China; oddly, the Ukraine war comes as something of an aberration. Perhaps that’s not logical – obviously Putin must have been planning this for some time aware that it would put Russia into heightened conflict with the West. But from the US and EU point of view, it has remained business as usual with Russia despite the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, the slaughter in Syria etc. 

Yes there were mild sanctions after Crimea, but so mild that no-one noticed; not only was Russia the major supplier of oil and gas to Europe, but nearly all European powers sold weapons to Russia; the US was somewhat more hawkish, but still for the most part it was business as usual, with a great deal of direct cooperation in Syria in particular. If the US was engaged in a “war drive against Russia” as “anti-imperialists” claim, it is funny that there was zero build-up in Eastern Europe right up until the Russian invasion. The US rivalry with Russia was, kin my view, more about US rivalry with the much more economically powerful (compared to Russia) EU; the US, since the 1990s, has feared a Eurasia-wide EU-Russia economic-military convergence that would freeze out the US and give more teeth to an economically powerful Europe. But as long as the S can keep this at bay (which Putin has just done for the US!), China remains the key US rival, not the EU nor Russia.

Nevertheless, Putin has forced a new West-Russia rivalry onto both the US and the EU, so we can hardly deny that at this moment there is a serious clash between US-EU and Russia!

But has the EU become completely subservient to the US? And has China lined up completely with Russia? I would say no to both. China has not voted for Russia in any UN resolution, and is not helping Russia other than by buying its oil, something China would buy from anyone. There is still underlying rivalry between China and Russia, eg, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ across southern Asia to Europe competes with the Russian-EU connection to some extent, and Putin has just boosted the ‘China road’. Meanwhile, China is happy to see the US get bogged down in Europe over Ukraine rather than spend too much energy in east Asia and the Pacific. And while NATO has been boosted and US hegemony over Europe seems stronger than at any time for 30 years, the overtures of France, Germany and Italy to Putin reveal a different underlying view and interests. Yes Germany used the crisis to double its defence budget and announce a ‘return of Germany’, but since ahs sent very little to Ukraine; an increased German military actually adds to the spectre more long term of a more independent Europe.

So my view is it is somewhat mixed, but with one major rivalry (US v China).

 

2. 

Is the territorial-centric aspect of the new "Eastern" imperialism (as its reactionary aspect) a complementary or an essential element of it?

By “Eastern” I assume you mean Russian? Because China for example has not annexed anywhere (well, except for the islands in the South China Sea formerly belonging to Vietnam, over several decades, but small islands that no-one in the world notices are hardly similar to a massive country like Ukraine). Meanwhile, China’s economic imperialism, without territorial conquest, now takes place on a massive global scale.

I guess for Russia it is a bit of both – ‘complementary’ in the sense that Russia does already engage in economic imperialism, especially in parts of the Mideast and Africa so it is not purely ‘territorial-centric’, but ‘essential’ in as much as Russia’s economic reach is so limited compared to the US, Europe or China. 

I think an imperialist superpower like Russia refuses to see itself as weaker, or as ‘hemmed in’ geographically by Europe on one side and China on the other; 

I believe domination of the Black Sea both for its resources and as a strategic waterway was seen as virtually do-or-die for Russian imperialism’s unrealistic aims of equality with other major imperialisms. It is arguably at odds with a more rational capitalist integration of Russia into Europe as part of ‘Eurasia’, but one which would not be dominated by the world’s new ‘Peter the Great’. 

I think we’re partly dealing with the subjective factor here alongside Russia’s underlying economic weakness.

Russia has this in common with certain other small-scale imperialist powers, above all Israel.

 

3. 

The necessary alliance with the "enemy of the enemy" is a cause of the alienation of the sectarian anti-imperialists of the West, but does it not also pose a danger to the leftists of the East "from the other way around"? Beyond wishful thinking, how and when will the peoples of the whole world meet, when they are thus divided into opposing, necessarily, allied formations?

I’m sure it poses the same problem for leftists in the East in reverse, in seeing Western ‘liberal’ imperialism as preferable, perhaps even tending to fall in behind the absurd rhetoric of ‘democracy versus autocracy’, as if the US does not continue to support bloody dictatorships, tyrannical monarchies and apartheid regimes. The more conscious leftists we are in touch with in Ukraine for instance are very well-aware of this, but it’s hard to be sure how widespread illusions may be. Of course, this is also a danger for leftists in the West who rightly reject the sectarian “anti-imperialist” shilling for Putin and other reactionary regimes on ‘the other side’ but out of disgust go one step too far. We need to be very aware of this danger and to reject it.

Just at this moment tough, the problem is that it is Russia invading and occupying a large country, so there is a need to get that defeated. In 2003, it was the US, in Iraq. The US has just been driven from Afghanistan. Israel continues to occupy Palestine, but this has not been an ‘East-West’ division, with Putin’s excellent relations with Israel and China, which bought the port of Haifa, having massive economic relations with Israel; and in any case this is an ongoing issue. Likewise the Saudi atrocities in Yemen; Saudi Arabia has excellent relations with both Russia and China and has refused to condemn Russia in the UN, and likewise Russia supports the Saudi-backed Yemeni government as the legitimate government (as does China). The acute world focus now is Ukraine, which both gives us western leftists responsibilities to support Ukraine evicting the Russian occupation, while also not letting up on the crimes of western imperialism and its smaller allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

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