Draft Critique of Neo-Marxism/Post-Marxism.

Draft Critique of Neo-Marxism/Post-Marxism. 

The general theoretical framework of Marxism was handed down to us through Karl Marx's "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy." The basic concepts that make up this scheme, such as "productive forces, productive relations, base and superstructure" etc., are subject to the basic ontological division "base-superstructure", where the productive factor and main is the (economic) base and the produced and secondary is the superstructure (ideas, legal forms, state, institutions, etc.). 

This supposed ontological division has been exhaustively criticized by both Marxist-neo-Marxists and anti-Marxists. 

A criticism that is largely apt and sometimes subversive, in order to either destroy or complement Marxism. But let's look at a bad version of this criticism within the left and anarchism. 

The old Marxist scheme may have contained a dogmatic reductionism in relation to a basic single cause and its many manifestations presented as the many effects of that one cause, but the new post-Marxist/neo-Marxist scheme replaces this metaphysical proto-Marxist division with a holistic form that ultimately suffers from a more intolerable and dogmatic monism. 

The "many" causes of the neo-leftists, as "causes" that explain the ontological reason why a class-dominant system exists or does not exist, merge into a complex whole-One (Eν), which, however, as an One (Εν), constitutes primarily an object that is judged with a moralistic sectarian indictment by an ideological tribunal. 

Nothing remains separate as a structure, everything is unified in a ontological monistic multiplicity, in which is "Evil", and in the end there is a complete impossibility of any analytical or moral judgment. The older Marxist scheme as we traced it initially was more apt and through its dogmatism provided the possibility to better understand a concept of multiplicity and freedom.

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To support a hypothesis we brought a first example from the Marxist tradition.

Our hypothesis is that an ontological theoretical position that separates a primary from a secondary element in relation to the determining function of the social structure, while it seems that it downplays the ontological power of what is considered as secondary and also that it overlooks the unity of the social phenomenon, in reality it may give the supposed secondary element more ontological material freedom than the freedom given to it by supposedly holistic theories of "fixing" the original first theory.

Ιωάννης Τζανάκος