Τρίτη 14 Φεβρουαρίου 2023

Iran. Crucial question.

 
How will the Iranian left be able to distinguish the truly democratic Iranian bourgeois ideological and political forces from the Bonapartist would-be followers of monarchists and also the semi-theocratic "reformists"? and how could it perhaps structure an even temporary anti-theocratic but democratic (and not only anti-theocratic) other alliance with realy democrats?
First, by asking the selfdeclaring as democrats what kind of form of state they desire.
Do they implicitly accept from the first constitutional "moment" that the sovereign "body" of sovereignty will be an assembly of freely elected representatives of the Iranian people?
No hybrid Bonapartist institutional additions.
Anyone who does not clearly answer this question in the affirmative is not a bourgeois democrat, or simply a supporter of a normal bourgeois democracy, but a Bonapartist adventurer who simply desires a more secular form of hybrid fascism.
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From what I know, as a non-expert, I draw the conclusion that the only ideological faction in Iran that would respect even the narrowest version of real, i.e. bourgeois, democracy is the Iranian left, plus some centrist tendencies that have not succeeded yet to fully disassociate themselves from the monarchical Loop that suffocates the bourgeois liberal forces.
Next to these forces there is the reformist branch of the theocrats, which, however, seems to participate in underground collusions with the monarchists and some "high" pro-Western personalities.
As I have pointed out, the political imagination of these curiously intertwined "circles" is imprisoned in hybrid institutional-political imaginations, which not go beyond essential elements of Khomeini's authoritarian hybridism.
Besides, Khomeinism has created a Bonapartist theocratic hybrid, while the authoritarian semi-liberal circles around the would-be royal frog and the "reformers" dare not speak openly of a normal bourgeois, representative parliamentary democracy, so their political imagination is necessarily bound to the hybridism of Khomeinism, even if there is a non-theocratic or semi-theocratic variant of this hybridism.
There may be other political developments and emergences, or there may be data that I do not know yet, as I told you I am not an expert.
As long as these possible data apply to Iran's political system, as it is understood in its broadest form, which of course includes the entire opposition (and not only its established structure), ONLY the left in Iran has a structural and stable relationship with the demand of democracy, even if it is understood as bourgeois democracy.
But from this point and beyond, other "paradoxes" begin.
 
Ιωάννης Τζανάκος

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